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REGULATING PHYSICIAN BEHAVIOR: 
TAKING DOCTORS’ “BAD LAW” CLAIMS SERIOUSLY 
SANDRA H. JOHNSON* 
INTRODUCTION 
Physicians are the nerve center of the health care beast.  This is so even 
after the developments of the past two or three decades in which the hospital 
has emerged as a mature organization with interests that it pursues apart from 
its medical staff, and health care payers have established extensive 
bureaucracies to control physician-driven costs.  Physician behavior remains a 
key target of government regulation that is intended to improve the efficiency, 
quality, and accessibility of health care.  In fact, one might say that the core of 
the health law enterprise,1 both public and private,2 has been focused on 
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piece, and to my student research assistants Kelly Carroll and Tyler Gibb who persevered 
throughout.  I am also grateful for the rare opportunity I enjoyed in this symposium.  I have long 
admired the work of each of the scholars who participated, and I am very grateful for their 
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conference and working with each of the authors in developing this publication.  As always, I 
appreciate the special academic community that is Saint Louis University School of Law, and 
especially the Center for Health Law Studies, and the support of our Dean, Jeffrey Lewis. 
 1. An entertaining debate is raging as to whether health law has a “core” and, in fact, 
whether the field exists at all.  See, e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. 
L. REV. 247 (2003) (considering current models of health law and presenting an alternative model 
to guide the development of health law); Symposium, Rethinking Health Law, 41 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 341 (2006); Theodore W. Ruger, Health Law’s Coherence Anxiety, 96 GEO. L.J. 625 
(2008). 
 2. This paper places legislation, litigation, and administrative regulation under the single 
umbrella of legal efforts to “regulate” physician behavior.  There are significant differences in the 
operation and behavior of each of these legal regimes; those differences have been explored 
elsewhere.  See, e.g., William M. Sage, Unfinished Business: How Litigation Relates to Health 
Care Regulation, 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 387 (2003).  While this paper uses the term 
regulation to signify governmental efforts to regulate physician behavior, that term has been used 
frequently to include private efforts to determine behavior.  This paper does not ignore those 
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incentivizing, deterring, and directing physician behavior3 across a wide range 
of activities,4 including essential components of the doctor-patient relationship. 
More than simply detecting and punishing the maverick doctor, legal 
efforts to control physician behavior over the past several decades have aimed 
at transforming the practice of medicine.  This effort intended to work 
fundamental change in both the physician-patient relationship and the relation 
of medicine to the market.5   
Doctors6 frequently claim that the very law intended to improve the lot of 
their patients is instead making the doctors provide poor care.7  These “bad 
law” claims are levied against malpractice litigation that makes doctors 
practice “defensive medicine”;8 against patients’ rights that make doctors 
 
private efforts, see infra Part II.C, but instead addresses them as distinct from public regulation of 
physician behavior. 
 3. “The historical evolution of the field of health law starts with this central focus on the 
physician-patient relationship.”  Barry R. Furrow, From the Doctor to the System: The New 
Demands of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 67, 69 (2004) (describing the expanding scope of 
the health law field); see also Elliot S. Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: 
The Extended Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. W-44 (2006), http://content.health 
affairs.org/webexclusives/index.dtl?year=2006 (criticizing the “fragmented system” of care 
experienced by patients when regulatory and quality control measures place too much 
accountability on individual doctors); Nicolas P. Terry, A Medical Ghost in the E-Health 
Machine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 225, 227 (2004) (identifying the continuing physician-centrism of 
health law as a significant weakness). 
 4. Of course, hospitals are highly regulated as well: “[F]ew entities have been subjected to 
more extensive regulatory controls from all governmental levels than the acute care hospital.”  
John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation: A Call for Change 
in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 12 (2004). 
 5. See discussion infra Part I. 
 6. For a discussion of the problem of over-generalizing the profession by lumping all 
doctors together, see infra note 31. 
 7. Medicine is not entirely hostile to the operation of law within medical practice and, in 
fact, medicine often uses law as a tool.  For example, medical licensure provided a nascent 
allopathic medical profession with both a high degree of legitimacy and the ability to control the 
practice of outsiders, including practitioners of other schools of medicine.  Restrictive scope of 
practice regulation that limits the practice of non-physician health care providers is one 
continuing example of the use of law as a shield.  See, e.g., Scope of Practice: Allied Health 
Professionals Form Coalition to Oppose Efforts to Restrict Their Practices, 15 Health L. Rep. 
(BNA) 711 (June 15, 2006) (discussing the American Medical Association’s (AMA) Scope of 
Practice Partnership (SOPP), an advocacy group formed to influence state regulation). 
 8. See e.g., William M. Sage, Malpractice Reform as a Health Policy Problem, 12 
WIDENER L. REV. 107, 112–15 (2005) (defining “defensive medicine” as medical care that is 
motivated by the avoidance of liability rather than by benefit to patients); see also David M. 
Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile 
Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609, 2612 (2005) (reporting that 93% of physicians 
surveyed in Pennsylvania “sometimes or often” engage in at least one form of defensive medicine 
due to the threat of malpractice liability). 
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provide futile care;9 against controlled substances laws that require them to 
neglect their patients in pain10 or to deny their patients the sterile injection 
tools that would prevent the spread of disease;11 against antitrust laws that 
prevent doctors from organizing themselves in ways that would produce more 
cost-effective and accessible care;12 and against regulations that impede 
important medical research.13  These “bad law” claims assert that the law’s 
effort to promote patient health and well-being has actually caused significant 
harm. 
These “bad law” claims have often fallen on ears deafened by the reform 
effort itself.  Changes intended to move the physician-patient relationship to a 
more egalitarian or consumer-oriented model, whether through the legal 
obligation of informed consent or through the removal of legal barriers 
impeding operation of the market, required that traditional claims of 
professionalism be weakened or rejected.  Legal and policy efforts over the last 
several decades thus deconstructed the traditional claims of medical 
professionalism about the right relationship of law to medicine.  Medicine’s 
complaints about defective law came to be characterized as the work of a self-
serving guild, rather than a profession motivated by altruism and armed with 
expertise, or at least as the work of the recalcitrant “bad apples” who continued 
to resist improvements that the more enlightened among them embraced.14  
These narratives marginalized physicians’ “bad law” claims and diminished 
them as a source of legitimate information about the effectiveness of reform 
efforts. 
This paper argues that physicians’ “bad law” claims should be taken 
seriously and treated as sentinel events that warrant closer consideration.  
“Sentinel events,” as the term is currently used in health care quality 
improvement, describe incidents that cause injury or present a risk of serious 
 
 9. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Medical Futility and Implications for Physician Autonomy, 21 
AM. J.L. & MED. 221 (1995); Seth Rivera et al., Motivating Factors in Futile Clinical 
Interventions, 119 CHEST 1944, 1946 (2001). 
 10. See discussion infra Part II.D–E. 
 11. See Scott Burris et al., Harm Reduction in the Health Care System: The Legality of 
Prescribing and Dispensing Syringes to Drug Users, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 5 (2001). 
 12. See Thomas L. Greaney, When Politics and Law Collide: Why Health Care Reform Does 
Not Need Antitrust ‘Reform,’ 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 135 (1994). 
 13. See Symposium, Censorship and Institutional Review Boards, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 399 
(2007); see also Kathleen Dracup & Christopher W. Bryan-Brown, The Law of Unintended 
Consequences, 13 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 97, 99 (2004); Jennifer Kulynych & David Korn, The 
Effect of the New Federal Medical-Privacy Rule on Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 201 (2002); 
Beverly Woodward, Challenges to Human Subject Protections in US Medical Research, 282 
JAMA 1947 (1999). 
 14. See discussion infra Part I. 
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injury.15  These events are sentinel “because they signal the need for . . . 
investigation and response.”16  Doctors’ “bad law” complaints signal that there 
may be a risk of harm to patients caused by the effect of law on medical 
decisionmaking in particular circumstances. 
Again in the parlance of current quality efforts, these signaling events 
trigger an obligation to engage in a root cause analysis17 which requires that 
one examine sentinel events from the perspective of an entire system rather 
than as the failing of individuals.18  It focuses on the performance and 
outcomes of the system rather than on attaching fault to individual actors.  
Root cause analysis looks at the operation of a system upon the human beings 
that work within it rather than simply asking whether the individuals involved 
conformed themselves appropriately to the system.19  Importantly for the 
arguments in this paper, root cause analysis identifies system changes that 
accommodate observed and predictable behavior patterns rather than expecting 
these patterns to accommodate themselves to the system.20  Systemic change in 
response to the root cause analysis of sentinel events is intended to avoid harm 
in the future.21  Its accommodation of the system to established behavior 
patterns does not sacrifice quality or patient protection but rather uses these 
patterns strategically to better achieve quality and patient safety goals.22  
Neither the self-serving guild nor the “few bad apples” narrative of physicians’ 
“bad law” claims meets the expectations of root cause analysis and system 
change. 
As the discussion below will show, however, taking “bad law” claims 
seriously does not mean that they must be accepted at face value.  In fact, 
serious testing of such claims should provide the groundwork both for 
adjusting legal standards and processes when the complaints are valid and for 
rejecting the wholesale abandonment of useful standards and processes when 
complaints are not valid.  Far from arguing that reformers should retreat from 
challenging the medical profession’s claims of bad law, this paper argues that 
 
 15. THE JOINT COMMISSION, SENTINEL EVENTS POLICY AND PROCEDURES (July 2007), 
available at http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/PolicyandProcedures (follow 
“Sentinel Events Policy and Procedures”). 
 16. Id.  The Joint Commission requires that accredited hospitals set up systems to detect 
sentinel events; particular sentinel events must be reported to the Commission.  Id. 
 17. Root cause analysis was borrowed from other high risk industries and now is embedded 
in hospital quality efforts due to the Joint Commission’s requirements.  Despite its common use, 
the effectiveness of root cause analysis in reducing error and injury has been documented only 
anecdotally.  See, e.g., Albert W. Wu et al., Effectiveness and Efficiency of Root Cause Analysis 
in Medicine, 299 JAMA 685 (2008). 
 18. THE JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 15. 
 19. Id.; Wu, supra note 17, at 686. 
 20. THE JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 15. 
 21. Wu, supra note 17, at 687. 
 22. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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there is significant work to be done to test whether these claims are, in fact, 
dishonest and strategic, mistaken or misinformed, or valid and revealing.  
Absent this work, doctors’ bad law claims are likely to have either too much 
power or too little power.23  Only by mere accident will the formal response to 
these claims further the goals of health policy reformers. 
Using specific examples, this paper offers an instrumental analysis of “bad 
law” claims as a lens through which it explores the application and translation 
of law into medical practice.  Each of the “bad law” claims chosen for 
discussion involves a claim by doctors that a law intended to produce better 
health care is in fact causing them to treat their patients poorly. 
There is surprisingly little empirical research devoted to finding out 
whether or how doctors alter their behavior in response to legal risk.24  
Empirically grounded theories of human behavior contribute significantly to 
our understanding of how people make decisions and react to certain forms of 
communication, external constraints, and risks; these theories are increasingly 
migrating to analysis of law.25  Those behavioral theories may be extrapolated 
 
 23. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, Starr on the Corporatization and Commodification of 
Health Care: The Sequel, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 947, 956 (2004) (“My own diagnosis of 
why the health care ‘revolution’ failed to topple medicine as a ‘sovereign’ profession . . . [is] that 
the American political system is far too committed to compromise and half-measures . . . .”).  For 
further discussion of the influence of such claims, see infra Part III. 
 24. Most frequently, the best evidence available as to the influence of law is the ubiquitous 
attitude survey in which doctors identify legal requirements as the cause of their self-reported 
suboptimal behavior.  See, e.g., Flora Johnson Skelly, Fear of Sanctions Limits Prescribing of 
Pain Drugs, AM. MED. NEWS, Aug. 15, 1994, at 13 (reporting that 69% of doctors surveyed said 
that the risk of disciplinary action made them more conservative in prescribing opioids for pain, 
and that of this group, one-third said their patients thus suffered from untreated pain); HARRIS  
INTERACTIVE INC., COMMON GOOD, FEAR OF LITIGATION STUDY: THE IMPACT ON MEDICINE 8 
(2002), http://commongood.org/assets/attachments/57.pdf (reporting that 76% of doctors 
surveyed stated that concerns about malpractice litigation hurt their ability to provide quality care, 
and 79% that they themselves—and 91% have noticed that other physicians—ordered more tests 
than necessary due to concerns about malpractice).  Attitude surveys of this type are notoriously 
unreliable as indicators of either actual behaviors or actual motivations, and some believe that 
they may even be used strategically by doctors to achieve certain political goals.  See MARSHALL 
B. KAPP, OUR HANDS ARE TIED: LEGAL TENSIONS AND MEDICAL ETHICS 29 (1998) (calling 
such studies “‘feels bad’ surveys”). 
 25. Behavioral law and economics, for example, revises the law-and-economics analysis of 
the impact of law with a more empirically based understanding of human decisionmaking.  See, 
e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).  Cognitive 
theory generally is applied to a number of areas of law to anticipate and explain how people make 
decisions in legally significant contexts.  For an inventory of heuristics developed through 
cognitive psychology as applied to quality assessment, see Jason Ross Penzer, Note, Grading the 
Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, Marketing, and the Law of Information 
Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Health Care Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207 (1995).  See 
also Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics 
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further to physicians and could provide a useful framework for hypothesizing 
about physician behavior in reaction to fear of legal entanglement.  There is a 
rather substantial body of research, however, that identifies apparently unique 
experiences, motivations, and reactions on the part of physicians.  Research 
examining the training of physicians, for example, reveals heightened 
sensitivity to shame associated with errors, a refined notion of the centrality of 
character, and the attachment of serious moral content to breaches of 
particular, but not all, standards of behavior.26  In addition, significant distrust 
on the part of physicians toward the legal system may influence them to react 
differently to legal risks and incentives as compared to other risks and 
incentives.27  This research provides some basis for arguing that physicians are 
different from the general population and perhaps even from other 
professionals.  Of course, there are good reasons to believe that doctors are not 
unique but are quite like lawyers, and so the potential for borrowing from 
empirical research on lawyers to predict the behavior of doctors may be 
substantial.28  In regard to legal risk, however, one would expect that the 
 
Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189 (2009) (using behavioral economics to explain why the 
law’s use of financial incentives and financial regulation of physicians is and is not successful). 
 26. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE 
(2d ed. 2003) (the classic study of physician residency training in the late 1970s). 
 27. Trust has assumed a central position in discussions of efforts to regulate physician 
behavior.  Most of the literature addressing the difficult issue of the extent to which society, and 
patients in particular, generally trusts physicians, explains patterns in the regulation of medical 
practice or can be used as a guide for choices in regulatory form.  See, e.g., Mark A. Peterson, 
From Trust to Political Power: Interest Groups, Public Choice, and Health Care 26 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 1145, 1155–56 (2001).  Another trust, or confidence, issue that exists in this 
regulatory effort, however, is the trust or distrust that physicians carry for the law.  See, e.g., 
William M. Sage, Why Are Demonstrations of Comprehensive Malpractice Reform So (At All) 
Controversial?, 37 U. MEM. L. REV. 513, 515 (2007) (“[P]hysicians are demanding reform 
because of their own emotions rather than documented fact—that for over a generation they have 
been scared of lawyers and that their fear leads them to practice worse medicine.”); see also 
ROBERT A. BURT, DEATH IS THAT MAN TAKING NAMES: INTERSECTIONS OF AMERICAN 
MEDICINE, LAW, AND CULTURE 69 (2002) (“A 1973 report by a federal commission . . . conveys 
the professional paranoia of the time in its opening observation: . . . ‘As one member of the 
Commission put it, “As a physician, I live in an aura of fear—fear of suit . . . .  It may be hard to 
believe but we are a frightened profession . . . .  [The doctor] really doesn’t want to believe the 
hostility he feels.”’”); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: 
Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2002) (arguing that 
defensive medicine often occurs “solely (or mostly) to reduce the probability of litigation”); 
sources cited infra notes 209, 221–223 (immunity statutes). 
 28. See, e.g., Diane E. Hoffmann, Are Health Care Conflicts All That Different? A 
Contrarian View, 29 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235 (2008) (arguing that conflicts involving 
doctors and patients are more like conflicts involving lawyers and clients than not). 
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reactions may be quite distinct due to differing levels of familiarity.29  On the 
other hand, studies of physician behavior in relation to financial incentives 
tend to show that doctors change their behavior in response to payment and 
profit in ways expected of the rest of humankind.30 
Furthermore, this paper refers to “doctors” as a single population.  Of 
course, this device suffers from the weakness of all generalizations: what one 
gains in simplicity of reference, one loses in complexity. 31  In the face of the 
very thin relevant research on the issues addressed in this paper, however, the 
generalization is unavoidable.  Finally, even if we had a better understanding 
of how doctors generally react to legal risk, it would not resolve the question of 
how doctors respond to particular legal requirements or legal risks.32  This 
paper proceeds despite, or because of, the significant gaps in relevant empirical 
 
 29. J. Douglas Peters et al., An Empirical Analysis of the Medical and Legal Professions’ 
Experiences and Perceptions of Medical and Legal Malpractice, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 601, 
625–29 (1986). 
 30. See, e.g., Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to 
Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 252 (2003) (reporting that prescribing patterns respond 
to even small financial rewards).  But see Paul H. Rubin, An Uncertain Diagnosis, REGULATION, 
Summer 2005, at 34, 37–38 (noting that the data does not support conclusions that the 
prescriptions were not medically appropriate).  Studies on the influence of gifting on physician 
practice also do not account for the impact of the pedagogical interventions proven to be effective 
in altering physician behavior that accompany these gifts.  See Sandra H. Johnson, Polluting 
Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding Off-Label 
Prescribing, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 78–79 (2008); discussion infra Part III.A. 
 31. Janet Dolgin argues, for example, that the medical profession is experiencing an 
ideological division over the appropriate relationship between medicine and profit.  Janet L. 
Dolgin, Debating Conflicts: Medicine, Commerce and Contrasting Ethical Orders, 35 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 705, 718–19 (2006).  Based on her review of the rhetoric of the debate within medicine, 
Dolgin concludes that the more traditional segment of the profession views the relationship 
between medicine and the market as one which threatens the focus on healing.  Id. at 721–22.  
The other segment of the profession assumes that medicine can achieve more good things with 
the support of industry than without it.  Id. at 722–25; see also M. Gregg Bloche, The Market for 
Medical Ethics, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1099, 1106 (2001) (“The [medical] profession 
has become a complex mix of overlapping subgroups with both shared and competing 
interests.”); John Harley Warner, Grand Narrative and Its Discontents: Medical History and the 
Social Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 757, 769 (2004) 
(recognizing that “the medical profession” as a category of analysis is an overgeneralization). 
 32. Substantial studies of physician reaction to the malpractice system conclude that 
physicians generally view it as haphazard, unpredictable, and unfair.  See, e.g., Michelle M. 
Mello et al., Fostering Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 375, 
388 (2005) (“One concern [of using tort law to regulate patient safety] is that there is scant 
evidence that physicians process the deterrent signal sent by malpractice litigation in a 
constructive way.”).  It is not known whether the same is true of other legal signals. 
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research on physicians’ reactions to legal requirements because there is no 
other choice at this point.33 
Part I of this paper further explains the context for the sections that follow.  
It briefly describes the reform agenda of health law and its relationship to 
understandings of claims based on traditional professionalism.  This section 
also acknowledges significant critiques of evaluating law based solely on its 
consequences; and thus, it sets limits on expectations for empirical work. 
Part II analyzes “bad law” claims made by physicians in specific contexts.  
After acknowledging that some “bad law” claims make a scapegoat of legal 
requirements in the service of doctors’ self-interest, this section examines how 
common learning and decisionmaking patterns in medicine may lead doctors to 
misunderstand specific legal requirements and legal risk.  The section then 
moves on to consider two situations in which analysis of formal legal 
requirements and processes fails to produce any evidence of the bad law that 
the doctors claim exists.  In each of these two situations, a shadow system may 
be operating to confound the expressed intent and purpose of the law.  Finally, 
the section addresses situations in which scapegoating, misunderstanding, and 
shadow systems have each been ruled out as a root cause of the specific “bad 
law” claim, leaving one to conclude that the rules simply are wrong. 
While often marginalized and misinterpreted, doctors’ “bad law” claims 
are not entirely ignored.  Part III examines several of the most common 
responses to “bad law” claims.  Educational efforts to disabuse doctors of their 
misunderstanding of the law and overestimation of legal risk are often the 
frontline response, and this section begins with an analysis of these efforts.  
This section then addresses immunity statutes as a common legislative 
response to doctors’ claims that legal risk forces them to behave 
inappropriately, and safe harbors as a regulatory effort to create a safe space 
for particular activities by restraining prosecutorial discretion.  Finally, this 
section discusses the legal response to situations in which legal risk is 
unbalanced, fails to reflect policy goals, and inappropriately falls on only one 
side of a treatment choice.  In using these specific examples, this section 
explains why “bad law” claims persist despite remedies that would be expected 
to be effective. 
 
 33. Calls for more empirical research on the impact of law currently permeate legal 
scholarship.  See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider & Lee E. Teitelbaum, Life’s Golden Tree: Empirical 
Scholarship and American Law, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 53, 59–60.  Health law scholarship has 
begun to respond to this call, albeit in some areas more than others.  See Michelle M. Mello & 
Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649 
(2008); see also Blum, supra note 4, at 20 (noting that “law is often cast as a tool to positively 
address some of the causes of medical errors,” but that the literature on medical error has not 
considered “the role of law as a causative element” of medical error in its impact on hospital 
structure and behavior). 
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Part IV makes recommendations on two fronts.  First, it calls for a different 
framework for evaluating the impact of law on medicine.  It argues that the 
evaluation of the law as applied should be reframed to examine population-
based effects on the behavior of physicians.  Second, Part IV addresses 
circumstances in which policy-level decisions relating to enforcement 
strategies operate to highjack the formal legal standards that have been put in 
place to govern physician practice.  In this latter effort, the paper recommends 
that regulators audit the performance of the monitoring and investigation 
stages of the regulatory process to reduce negative spillover effects.  
Specifically, this section argues that regulators should adjust monitoring 
systems, by choosing between visible and invisible systems, to accommodate 
physician sensitivity to oversight without abandoning the regulatory goal that 
the monitoring system seeks to obtain.  It also offers a critique of “catch-and-
release” investigation practices, which subject a significantly larger number of 
doctors to governmental inquiries with the intention of moving to sanctions on 
only a few. 
These recommendations do not require reducing the commitment to the 
underlying legal requirements.  Nor are they another iteration of the familiar 
debates over whether regulatory enforcement systems should provide 
individual inspectors with discretion and flexibility rather than requiring a 
stricter and more rule-oriented process.34  The recommendations do, however, 
assume that knowledge of the way that physicians alter their behavior in the 
face of legal risk can provide a legitimate tool for the design of regulatory 
systems.35  These discrete recommendations also acknowledge that “bad law” 
complaints can have substantial political power in the absence of serious 
examination and may indeed result in formal responses that undermine the 
publicly adopted goals of the regulatory system. 
I.  THE REFORM EFFORT 
A. Reforming Law to Reform Medicine 
To the extent that law imposes standards external to the medical 
profession, it departs from the traditional model of professionalism in which 
standards of practice emerge from and are enforced by the profession itself.36  
 
 34. See, e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE 
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 34–35 (1982) (describing the “rule versus 
discretion” dilemma in regulatory enforcement as “ancient”). 
 35. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 36. Of course, medical malpractice law still formally rests primarily on the notion that the 
standard of care against which an individual physician’s behavior is to be measured for liability 
purposes is that which is evident in contemporary medical practice.  See BARRY F. FURROW ET 
AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 336–39 (6th ed. 2008).  Informed 
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The duty of informed consent, for example, one of the fundamental building 
blocks of the modern physician-patient relationship, can accurately be viewed 
as a creature of the law.37  There is debate about whether the practice of 
informed consent grounded as an ethical obligation would have emerged from 
within the medical profession itself at a later time without the interference of 
judicial opinions.38  Neither the practice of informed consent nor strong 
support for the concept, however, had developed within medicine prior to 
judicial intervention.  Although calls for informed consent to be recognized as 
an ethical foundation for medical treatment predated the landmark Canterbury 
v. Spence,39 the case law at least accelerated its development if it did not 
actually create the concept out of whole cloth.  Certainly, for better or worse, 
and probably for worse, subsequent legal developments—including statutory 
presumptions attached to the execution of the consent form40—contributed 
significantly to the current practice of “consenting” patients.41  Similarly, court 
 
consent and the relative authority of doctors and family in decisionmaking at the end of life, both 
of which developed at least in part through malpractice litigation and which are discussed in this 
paper, are examples of departures from standard practice.  See also Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors 
Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (regarding provision of oxygen to 
neonates), and Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (regarding testing for glaucoma), for 
instances in which courts imposed standards of care that exceeded customary practice. 
 37. See Alan Meisel, Canterbury v. Spence: The Inadvertent Landmark Case, in HEALTH 
LAW AND BIOETHICS: CASES IN CONTEXT 9, 33 (Sandra Johnson et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the 
significance and context of the case). 
 38. See JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 52 (1984). 
 39. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding that doctors’ overall 
obligation to a patient includes a duty of reasonable disclosure of therapy choices and 
corresponding risks); see, e.g., Jon R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, Informed Consent to 
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. Rev. 628, 637–44, 644 n.63 (1969). 
 40. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-6(d) (2006) (providing that a written and signed 
consent that “discloses in general terms the treatment or course of treatment . . . shall be 
conclusively presumed to be a valid consent in the absence of fraudulent misrepresentations of 
material facts”); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.103(4)(a) (West 2005) (providing that a written 
and signed consent creates a “rebuttable presumption” of informed consent); IND. CODE ANN. § 
34-18-12-2 (LexisNexis 1998) (providing that written consent can create a “rebuttable 
presumption” of informed consent); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 2005) (providing that 
written consent can create “a presumption” of informed consent). 
 41. The presumption statutes gut the requirement of informed consent in its broader sense of 
patient-centered decisionmaking as an enforceable legal standard, and they can be viewed as an 
abandonment of the aspirations for empowerment of patients embedded within that principle.  See 
Alan Meisel & Lisa D. Kabnick, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment: An Analysis of Recent 
Legislation, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 407, 416–17, 467–77 (1980); see also Peter H. Schuck, 
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 932–38 (1994).  These statutes may illustrate 
collusion between medicine and law, and the capture of state legislatures by the medical 
profession.  Meisel & Kabnick, supra, at 469.  On the other hand, they may simply be a rational 
restraint on lawsuits that should leave the normative and signaling effect of the legal requirement 
in place.  See id. at 415 & n.18, 467–68; Schuck, supra, at 939–47 (advocating for a cost-
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opinions concerning refusal of treatment at the end of life, beginning with 
Quinlan, established that the right to make those decisions belonged to the 
patient rather than to the physician alone. 42  Again, arguments to that effect 
already existed in the literature in ethics43 and moral theology,44 but Quinlan 
elevated patient choice in the face of significant resistance among the medical 
profession.45  Although some would argue that Quinlan preserved a controlling 
role for physicians,46 the decades of legislation and court cases after Quinlan 
assumed the primacy of patient choice and tested the boundaries of that choice 
as against social norms and practical and conceptual challenges in surrogate 
decisionmaking. 
These legislative and judicial efforts intended from the start to be more 
than routine policing actions.  They did not merely strengthen or take over the 
enforcement aspect of medical self-regulation; they aimed instead at 
transforming customary medical practice.  For this reason, health law has been 
called a reform movement.47 
 
effectiveness analysis of informed consent to determine if it helps to keep health care costs 
down).  A similar backing away from the initial goals and principles of antitrust law has also been 
observed.  See, e.g., Thomas (Tim) Greaney, Thirty Years of Solicitude: Antitrust Law and 
Physician Cartels, 7 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 189 (2007). 
 42. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976). 
 43. See, e.g., LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE 
CHALLENGE FOR BIOETHICS 201–29 (2002). 
 44. Pope Pius XII, The Prolongation of Life, Address Before an International Congress of 
Anesthesiologists (Nov. 24, 1957), in 4 THE POPE SPEAKS 393, 397 (1958) (stating that the 
doctor’s right to continue ventilator support relies on consent from the family or the patient).  See 
Stanley J. Reiser, View the Third, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S13, S14, 
discussing Pope Pius XII’s address: “[T]he moment when both the physician and the Pope 
acknowledged that a problem was beyond them is perhaps as good a time as any to take as the 
beginning of the modern biomedical ethics movement.”  See also Brief for New Jersey Catholic 
Conference as Amicus Curiae, Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (No. A-116), in 2 IN THE MATTER OF 
KAREN QUINLAN: THE COMPLETE BRIEFS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND OPINION IN THE NEW 
JERSEY SUPREME COURT 197 (1976) (supporting the Quinlan family’s decision to withdraw 
treatment). 
 45. See BURT, supra note 27, at 67–70 (discussing the case law that dismantled physician 
authority and noting that the case law reflected changing social attitudes toward physicians); see 
also Sandra H. Johnson, Quinlan and Cruzan: Beyond the Symbols, in HEALTH LAW AND 
BIOETHICS, supra note 37, at 53, 68 (discussing the Quinlan decision in light of the negative 
reactions it elicited from various members of the medical community). 
 46. See, e.g., M.L. Tina Stevens, The Quinlan Case Revisited: A History of the Cultural 
Politics of Medicine and the Law, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 347, 362–63 (1996). 
 47. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law 
and Policy, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 107 (2004) (regarding health care antitrust law); Carl E. 
Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 411 (2006) (regarding bioethics).  Reform 
of the physician-patient relationship occurred contemporaneously with the broader civil rights 
movements that emphasized individual rights.  Paul Starr observed that “[m]edical care figured 
prominently in this generalization of rights, particularly as a concern of the women’s movement 
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The reform aspect of health law is especially pronounced in the context of 
bioethics.  Many histories of bioethics, in fact, attribute its origins to legal 
interventions.  For some, the Quinlan case gave birth to the field.48  Others 
identify the Nuremberg Trials concerning the Nazi experiments as the 
beginning of bioethics,49 and still others, the events that set the stage for the 
familiar scandal-reform call and response common in health care regulation 
generally.50 
The building blocks of bioethics bear law’s imprint—the emphasis on 
individual rights, the primacy of autonomy, and the default to procedure and 
evidentiary rules rather than substance for the resolution of conflict.51  Legal 
tools became the instruments both of radical change and of moderation in 
bioethics.52  This is not to say that law was the only player in the generation of 
bioethics, but law was at the table in even the earliest efforts.53  
 
and in the new movements specifically for patients’ rights and for the rights of the handicapped, 
the mentally ill, the retarded, and the subjects of medical research.”  PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 388–89 (1982).  Others note the current effect of 
increased commercialization, the emergence of evidence-based medicine in response to variations 
in medical practice, and the expanded management prerogatives stimulated by financing changes.  
See, e.g., BOSK, supra note 26,  at xiv; Bloche, supra note 31, at 1108–09; Dolgin, supra note 31, 
at 712–14. 
 48. Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at 
S1, S3 (identifying the Quinlan case, revelations of abuse in medical research, and the allocation 
of dialysis machines by a citizen committee in Seattle as potential birthdates for the field). 
 49. See, e.g., BURT, supra note 27, at 80 (stating that the influence of the Nuremberg Code is 
the key to understanding the current emphasis on the “self-determination principle” in medical 
treatment contexts). 
 50. See Arthur L. Caplan, What Bioethics Brought to the Public, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S14, S14 (noting that the media was attracted to covering bioethics issues 
because they arose in scandals). 
 51. “Law sides with patients to oppose the arbitrary use of power whether by physicians or 
the government; the rubric is patient rights.  This is why American law, not philosophy or 
medicine, is primarily responsible for the agenda, development and current state of American 
bioethics.”  GEORGE J. ANNAS, STANDARD OF CARE: THE LAW OF AMERICAN BIOETHICS 3 
(1993).  But see Daniel Callahan, Why America Accepted Bioethics, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S8, S8 (identifying American liberalism as the source of bioethics’ emphasis 
on patients’ rights); Robert M. Veatch, From Forgoing Life Support to Aid-in-Dying, HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S7, S7 (attributing the emphasis to the social movements of the 
1960s). 
 52. Callahan, supra note 51, at S8, notes that bioethics took a middle course between 
extreme positions: “That middle course is regulation . . . . On the one hand you avoid the 
extremes of simple prohibition of things, while on the other hand you show that you are serious 
and willing to be cautious.” 
 53. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW AND 
BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 3–4 (1991) (identifying bioethics as an 
interdisciplinary effort); K. Danner Clouser, Bioethics and Philosophy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Nov.–Dec. 1993, at S10, S10. 
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Recommendations emerging from the works of the first multidisciplinary 
groups to approach bioethics problems were rather quickly translated into legal 
standards.54  The influence of the law in developing this new field as 
something distinct from “medical ethics” is undeniable.55 
The reform agenda of health law does not stop at bioethics.  Change in the 
law applicable to physicians’ financial and business dealings intended, in part, 
to deter collusion and cartel behavior among doctors and to realign their 
financial interests to better serve those of the payment systems and efficiency 
concerns.56 Changing the legal environment for physicians’ financial 
relationships, including extending the restrictions of antitrust law to the 
medical profession, was a “revolutionary cause,”57  intended to encourage 
doctors to change their behaviors—to be more entrepreneurial, to be more 
market-oriented than tradition allowed, but not too much so.58  Regulation of 
physicians’ behavior to strike the appropriate balance between the ideal of a 
free market and the reality of market failure—for example in the context of 
billing, payment to medical researchers, joint ventures, or receipt of financial 
support from vendors—represents a significant reform movement as well.59 
 
 54. See, e.g., The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine the 
Definition of Brain Death, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 JAMA 85 (1968) [hereinafter 
Ad Hoc Committee] (defining determination of death).  See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 
647, 656 (N.J. 1976) (accepting the Ad Hoc Committee’s standards); Eun-Kyoung Choi et al., 
Brain Death Revisited: The Case for a National Standard, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 824, 825 
(2008) (recounting that state legislatures began to write the concept of brain death into law 
following the Ad Hoc Committee’s report). 
 55. Callahan, supra note 51, at S8 (“[R]egulation [is] the way we in the United States 
typically deal with controversial issues.”); Veatch, supra note 51, at S7 (“The development of 
rights approaches is totally alien to the traditional Hippocratic medical ethics.”).  But see Roger 
B. Dworkin, Bioethics? The Law and Biomedical Advance, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 43, 44 (2004), 
for the argument that “lawyers have nothing special to say about any of these [bioethics] matters” 
and that philosophy is “best equipped to evaluate bio-social questions.” 
 56. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 41, at 189–90; Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of 
Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 
532–33 (1988). 
 57. Havighurst, supra note 47, at 118 (describing the developments that shifted legal norms 
away from professional control and toward the market, including the extension of antitrust laws 
to health care); see also James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform and Competing Visions of 
Medical Care: Antitrust and State Provider Cooperation Legislation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1459 
(1994) (arguing that application to, and enforcement of antitrust principles in the U.S. health care 
market have driven a paradigm shift). 
 58. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Government’s Role in 
Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849, 
924–26 (1981) (concluding that neither competition nor regulation alone provides an adequate 
and appropriate tool for controlling physician behavior and that the choice between regulatory 
and market approaches needs to be made on other than an abstract level). 
 59. Concerns about market-responsive behaviors, such as self-referrals and conflicts of 
interest, illustrate the continuing discomfort with market models for medical practice.  See 
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B. Reform and Professionalism 
According to health law and policy scholars,60 Paul Starr’s Pulitzer-prize-
winning book, The Social Transformation of American Medicine,61 is one of 
the most influential texts ever written about the medical profession and the 
health care system.  Its effect on legal scholarship is impressive: as of 2003, it 
had been cited more than 1400 times in 433 law review articles.62  In addition, 
Starr’s book appealed across ideological lines as it “redefined how lawyers 
think about medicine”; 63 providing support to those who sought to strengthen 
market forces as well as to those who sought to enhance justice concerns.64 
In his book, Paul Starr narrates the history of medicine through a lens that 
deconstructs the notion of profession, demonstrating that the medical 
 
generally MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS’ CONFLICTS OF 
INTERST (1993) (discussing physicians’ conflicts of interest and the incentives that cause them to 
increase or decrease services); Dolgin, supra note 31 (contrasting attitudes of physicians 
regarding the parameters of medicine as related to market incentives provided by the 
pharmaceutical industry); Benjamin P. Falit, Ancillary Service and Self-Referral Arrangements in 
the Medical and Legal Professions: Do Current Ethical, Legislative, and Regulatory Policies 
Adequately Serve the Interests of Patients and Clients?, 58 S.C. L. REV. 371 (2006) (comparing 
self-referral regulations pertaining to doctors and lawyers respectively); William M. Sage, Some 
Principles Require Principals: Why Banning “Conflicts of Interest” Won’t Solve Incentive 
Problems in Biomedical Research, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (2007) (addressing regulation of 
financial relationships in the field of medical research). 
 60. See Special Issue, Transforming American Medicine: A Twenty-Year Retrospective on 
The Social Transformation of American Medicine, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 557 (2004).  In 
addition to the Pulitzer Prize, Starr’s book won several prizes from academic and professional 
organizations, including the American College of Healthcare Executives, and was reviewed on 
the front page of the New York Times.  Joel D. Howell, What the Doctors Read, 29 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 781, 781–82 (2004). 
 61. STARR, supra note 47. 
 62. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Uses of The Social Transformation of American Medicine: 
The Case of Law, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 799, 799 (2004).  Jost observes that the effect of 
the book on health law as a practice, rather than as a field of study, is less clear, id. at 809, 
although it seems to have been especially influential in the application of antitrust law to the 
profession, id. at 811.  See also Howell, supra note 60, at 783 n.3 (noting that the Science 
Citation Index reported over 2000 citations to the book as of July 2003). 
 63. Jost, supra note 62, at 808 (quoting Sara Rosenbaum during an interview with Jost) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64. Jost notes that “[l]egal scholars from a wide range of perspectives found in the book an 
elegant, accessible, and comprehensive history of physician dominance of health care, which 
supported their own vision of how the health care system had to change.”  Id. at 807.  The book 
was viewed by free market advocates as refuting the view that professional power was a response 
to market failure, contra Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV, 941 passim (1963), rather than conscious and deliberate self-serving 
behavior; while it was viewed by the “left wing in health law scholarship” as providing an 
important framework for thinking about diverse problems of justice and rights, Jost, supra note 
62, at 808. 
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profession quite frequently—or perhaps inherently—advocates for its own 
self-interest in the guise of concerns over quality and with a claim of special 
expertise and professional virtue.65  The debunking of the myth of the 
profession by Starr and others66 laid the intellectual groundwork for the 
rejection of deference to professional self-regulation and self-governance. 
Medicine’s claims of altruism and special expertise as the best guardians of 
patient welfare have been used to justify paternalism in the physician-patient 
relationship and to insulate medicine from the discipline of the market.67  As 
this paternalism and insulation were peeled away, the deference traditionally 
accorded to the profession and its views of its right relationship to law were 
removed as well.68  This new understanding—that the traditional deference 
accorded the profession had been manipulated to subject law to its service—
certainly influenced how reformers heard physicians’ claims that the new legal 
order for medicine harmed rather than helped patients.69  Rather than the deep 
 
 65. STARR, supra note 47, at 15–16.  Although a key event in intellectual history, Starr’s 
book reflected social movements of its time in attacking professional hegemony, just as the 
ascendancy of physician dominance was supported by social movements of its era.  See Bernice 
A. Pescosolido & Jack K. Martin, Cultural Authority and the Sovereignty of American Medicine: 
The Role of Networks, Class, and Community, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 735, 737–38 
(2004) (distinguishing physician dominance and physician sovereignty in light of Starr’s book).  
Starr also recognizes the role of social movements in establishing and maintaining the status 
(whether high or low) of the medical profession over time.  STARR, supra note 47, at 144. 
 66. See, e.g., ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF 
MEDICAL CARE, at xi (1970); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM, at 
xi–xviii (1977); Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 9–
10 (1976).  Starr acknowledges that the view of medicine as a cartel was expressed in much of the 
literature of the time.  STARR, supra note 47, at 15–17.  In fact, the Supreme Court’s 1975 
decision applying antitrust law to the legal profession made a significant contribution to 
dismantling the legal deference traditionally accorded the “learned professions.”  Goldfarb v. Va. 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975). 
 67. William M. Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between 
Individual Health Law and Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497, 498–99 (2008) 
(“Professional (that is, physician) control over health care has a long, checkered history of both 
public-mindedness and protectionism.”). 
 68. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155, 155–
56 (2004) (discussing the movement from deference to the profession, through “modestly 
egalitarian” models, and finally to reliance on market forces). 
 69. See, e.g., David A. Hyman, When and Why Lawyers Are the Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 267, 268–69 (2008) (“[O]ne should view complaints by professionals about how 
competition will adversely affect consumers with considerable skepticism, because self-interest 
has a distinct tendency to skew such assessments.”).  Hyman notes that innovations in health care 
delivery attract “a heated response from the usual suspects making the usual arguments.”  Id. at 
271.  Hyman compares medicine and law, finding similar self-interest, although noting that the 
legal profession has been more successful in protecting itself.  Id. at  268; see also Clark C. 
Havighurst & Nancy M. P. King, Private Credentialing of Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust 
Perspective (pt. 2), 9 AM. J.L. & MED. 263, 291–92 (1983) (“Under the banners of ‘medical 
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insights of a venerable profession, such claims came to be viewed as the work 
of a self-serving guild that sought to protect itself.70  A great range of 
complaints—that informed consent was unworkable; that living wills were 
impractical; that licensure boards for medicine and for other health professions 
had to be controlled by doctors; that cost controls would dangerously confine 
treatment decisionmaking—could each be interpreted through the “self-serving 
guild” narrative in which medicine struggles to maintain physician control of 
treatment decisions through paternalism in the physician-patient relationship 
and through exemption from the workings of competitive markets. These 
claims could then be marginalized as merely self-interested and dismissed as 
an effort to grasp at the remnants of the gilded age of professional hegemony 
wherever possible.71 
Public regulation of physicians did not operate from a notion that all 
doctors were bad or that all medicine was bad, of course.  In fact, regulation 
generally justifies and orients itself around the few bad apples model of the 
profession.72  Its rules and enforcement efforts are targeted at finding, 
punishing, and deterring bad behavior on the part of a minority of the 
physician population.73  This model, too, influences how physician complaints 
about legal requirements are heard.  With the few bad apples in mind, 
 
science,’ ‘quality of care,’ and ‘professional prerogative,’ the medical profession was able to 
repel most attacks along its borders . . . .”).  Kenneth J. Arrow offers an opposing view of the 
significance of claims of professionalism in light of market failure in his classic article, 
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, supra note 64.  Arrow argues that 
professionalism overcomes market failures in the medical context and thus, its claims are socially 
beneficial.  See id. at 947, 967.  Arrow’s analysis of market failure has had significant influence 
on health policy, “eclipsing in influence [his] case for the social welfare benefits of 
anticompetitive professional norms.”  Bloche, supra note 31, at 1104. 
 70. See, for example, Bloche, supra note 31, at 1099–1100, for the argument that the “guild 
ideology,” as constructed by Richard Posner and others, understands claims of professionalism as 
serving the self-interest of guild members and “deceiv[ing] both its own adherents and the public 
concerning members’ furtherance of their own interests at society’s expense” and thus, does not 
deserve “law’s deference.”  See also Harold C. Sox, Editorial, Medical Professionalism and the 
Parable of the Craft Guilds, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 809 (2007) (using the illustration of 
medieval guilds to explain medicine’s current subjection to government control). 
 71. Regulatory collusion in the effort to retain status and power is recognized in critiques of 
administrative agency behavior based on regulatory capture.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Living 
Dangerously: A Defense of Mortal Peril, U. ILL. L. REV. 909, 927–28 (1998). 
 72. See, e.g., BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 65–66 (discussing the extension of the 
“bad apple” metaphor in health and occupational safety regulation); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, 
Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market?, 37 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 825, 839 (1995). 
 73. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 65 (arguing that the proportion of bad apples 
in most regulatory programs is overestimated despite suggestions to the contrary from 
commentators and from demonstrated regulatory practice). 
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resistance to efforts to punish and deter bad behavior can easily be interpreted 
as the squealing of these outliers or their empathetic allies. 
Dismissing “bad law” claims out of hand blocks efforts to seriously assess 
the operation and impact of the regulatory system at issue.74  The 
deconstruction of the traditional notions of professionalism and the 
construction of the guild and the few bad apples archetypes created a bias in 
the way that doctors’ “bad law” claims often have been received.  This 
selective hearing impedes the learning that closer examination of physician 
reports of defective legal standards and controls can yield.75  Furthermore, 
deference to medicine’s professionalism claims is not entirely extinct,76 and 
dependency on medicine’s superior knowledge can afford doctors’ “bad law” 
claims disproportionate authority.  Neither dismissiveness nor oversensitivity 
to doctors’ claims well serves efforts to reform physician behavior toward 
building a better health care system or providing better care to patients. 
C. Consequences as an Inadequate Basis for Evaluating Reform 
Concerning oneself with physicians’ “bad law” claims gives priority to the 
consequences of the law in relation to physician behavior.77  The assertion that 
the product of law reform should be evaluated based on its consequences does 
not go unchallenged, however.  Measuring legal standards solely by their effect 
gives an inadequate accounting of the purposes of law.  The symbolic and 
 
 74. See, e.g., Jesse A. Goldner, The Unending Saga of Legal Controls over Scientific 
Misconduct: A Clash of Cultures Needing Resolution, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 293, 343 (1998) (“The 
historical tendency in science to view research misconduct as aberrational has undoubtedly 
contributed to the lack of attention paid to the very real problems that often result from both true 
and untrue charges.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago’s Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in 
Health Care, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 858 (2004) (urging “courts and enforcers to pause” before 
applying rules to the health care marketplace). 
 76. See, e.g., Eric G. Campbell et al., Professionalism in Medicine: Results of a National 
Survey of Physicians, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 795, 795–96 (2007) (surveying physicians on 
the meaning of professionalism, and noting adoption of professionalism claims on the part of 
national medical organizations); Fred Hafferty, Finding Soul in a “Medical Profession of One,” 
28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 133, 136  (2003) (reviewing ELIOT FREIDSON, 
PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC (2001)) (“[O]rganized medicine has sought respite and 
redemption [from contemporary challenges] by embracing the ideology of professionalism with 
an almost religious fervor.”); Clark C. Havighurst, How the Health Care Revolution Fell Short, 
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 72–73 (2002); Rosenblatt, supra note 68, at 156. 
 77. The concern about the consequences of law originated with legal realism, predating and 
giving rise to theories of law and social norms, law and economics, critical legal studies, and 
more recently, cognitive theory and law.  See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Justice of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, The Path of the Law, Address Delivered at the 
Dedication of the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 991, 1001 (1997) (arguing that the law should be designed so that its actual effects take 
precedence over arguments based solely on morality or history or philosophy). 
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normative effect of law, for example, is significant even if it has little or no 
effect on behavior.78   
Legal norms in health care, in fact, quite explicitly rest on religious and 
ethical principles.  The opinion in Quinlan, for example, relied extensively on 
Catholic moral theology.79  Federal regulation of research rests on the 
normative framework of the Belmont Report.80  Arguments about physician 
payment regulation often speak in terms of physicians’ moral or ethical duties 
to their patients.81 
The influence of the normative content and purpose of law may be one 
reason that there is such a dearth of empirical research on the effect of law on 
physician behavior.82  In some areas of health law, for example in the legal 
requirement of informed consent83 or the implementation of living wills and 
 
 78. See generally Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social 
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603 (2000) (exploring the effect of law on social norms). 
 79. The opinion in Quinlan incorporates nearly the complete amicus brief filed by the 
conference of bishops of New Jersey.  For a discussion of the role of Catholic thought in this 
case, see Johnson, supra note 45, at 66–68. 
 80. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROT. OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH (1979), available at http://www.nih 
training.com/ohsrsite/guidelines/belmont.html.  For the report’s impact on federal regulations, see 
CARL H. COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN 
SUBJECTS 52–56 (2005). 
 81. See, e.g., Ron Roizen, Why I Oppose Drug Company Payment of Physician/Investigators 
on a Per Patient/Subject Basis, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Jan.–Feb. 1988, at 9 (questioning 
whether “percapita physician payment [is] ethical” and criticizing some physicians’ “self-serving 
deception” of patients). 
 82. See Sandra H. Johnson, End-of-Life Decision Making: What We Don’t Know, We Make 
Up; What We Do Know, We Ignore, 31 IND. L. REV. 13, 36 (1998) (discussing the tension 
between the norm-setting function of law and the demands that standards rest on substantial 
voluntary compliance); Mello et al., supra note 32, at 398–99 (attributing the lack of empirical 
research on cost-effectiveness of health care regulation to continuing deference to ethical norms).  
Another significant barrier to basing regulatory design on empirical research is the difficulty of 
designing effective and valid studies.  Compare William M. Sage, Judicial Opinions Involving 
Health Insurance Coverage: Trompe L’Oeil or Window on the World?, 31 IND. L. REV. 49 (1998) 
(arguing that current empirical research on judicial decisions is useless when it does not indicate 
whether or not the health insurance system is accomplishing public policy goals), with Karen A. 
Jordan, Empirical Studies of Judicial Decisions Serve an Important Role in the Cumulative 
Process of Policy Making: Comments on a Paper by Professor William Sage, 31 IND. L. REV. 81, 
87–88 (2008) (arguing that empirical studies of judicial decisions can play a more important role 
than Sage suggests), and Maxwell J. Mehlman, Getting a Handle on Coverage Decisions: If Not 
Case Law, Then What?: Comments on a Paper by Professor William Sage, 31 IND. L. REV. 75 
(2008) (agreeing that “case law is a poor source of empirical data” but disagreeing with Sage that 
other good sources of data exist).  See generally Mello & Zeiler, supra note 33, at 662–66 
(identifying “significant methodological challenges” to empirical health law studies). 
 83. Evidence concerning informed consent indicates that neither patients nor doctors are up 
to the task, both in terms of desire and capacity.  See Schneider, supra note 47, at 414. 
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patient determination of care at the end of life,84 we have significant evidence 
that the legal norm has been less than effective, at least in the way in which it 
was intended to work.85  We are unlikely to abandon informed consent as a 
requirement for treatment or patient choice as the touchstone for end-of-life 
care.  The evidence of the failings of this norm just does not matter.  This 
commitment evidences true belief both in the moral content of these legal 
standards specifically, and in the normative character of law generally.86  An 
appreciation for the expressive power of law itself supports an inclination to 
maintain aspirational norms.87 
Commitment to the normative content of such laws also breeds optimism 
that the gap between the ideal and the reality can be fixed using the force of 
law and supplementary levers, applied to physicians over enough time.  
Furthermore, if resistance is interpreted as a strategy in a battle over 
professional power or if these complaints are attributed to bad apples in the 
profession, they will be discounted.  These expectations lead critics to dismiss 
the possibility that professional resistance is a serious substantive critique of 
the design or function of the law.88  Both the normatic aspirations of law 
reform and low expectations for doctors’ responsiveness to reforms contribute 
to the rejection of “bad law” claims. 
 
 84. “[T]he facts are that applying the autonomy framework in end of life decision-making 
has had little practical effect and much fictitious posturing.  Efforts to persuade people to create 
and implement advance directives to protect their autonomy if they should become incompetent 
have essentially failed.”  Robert A. Burt, The End of Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 
(SPECIAL REP.), Nov.–Dec. 2005, at S9, S9. 
 85. Comparing the nature of the physician-patient relationship as it existed in the 1950s as 
compared to the twenty-first century, however, it is difficult to say that the patient’s position in 
the relationship has not changed considerably and that perhaps some of this change was produced 
by legal recognition of informed consent, at least as a normative principle or public policy.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 36–46.  On the other hand, the demise of the paternalistic model 
and the rise of the more egalitarian model may be more attributable to increasing 
commercialization in medicine rather than the informed consent norm.  Dolgin, supra note 31, at 
712–15. 
 86. Johnson, supra note 82, at 36. 
 87. Robert Gatter, Faith, Confidence, and Health Care: Fostering Trust in Medicine 
Through Law, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395, 438–45 (2004) (arguing that the law can be used as 
a powerful tool for increasing consumer confidence in health care). 
 88. Of course, some of the defense of legal standards, despite evidence of their 
ineffectiveness in achieving stated goals, may reflect self-interest on the part of the legal 
profession.  See, for example, Havighurst, supra note 47, at 122, noting “the power of the rights-
based legal paradigm and of the trial lawyers who defend [medical malpractice law]” for their 
own benefit. 
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II.  “BAD LAW” CLAIMS 
Not all “bad law” claims are the same.  Some are dishonest or strategic.  
Some result from misunderstanding or misinformation about the particular 
legal standard at issue.  Once dishonesty and confusion are ruled out, however, 
the remaining claims should be considered to be valid even if an examination 
of formal standards and processes do not confirm them to be so.  Some 
complaints about bad law refer not to formal legal requirements but rather to 
shadow systems that confound the intent and purpose of the formal legal 
requirements.  Doctors may be pointing at requirements that are adopted and 
enforced by private organizations, for example, or they may be identifying 
informal penalties imposed by processes through which the law is enforced by 
government agencies.  Finally, some “bad law” claims reveal that legal 
standards do, in fact, require bad medicine and harm, rather than improve, 
health care access, efficiency, or quality. 
This Part discusses each of these categories of “bad law” claims.  It begins 
with a brief discussion of dishonest claims.89  It then addresses claims that 
arise from misunderstanding, and demonstrates how physicians’ learning 
patterns breed misinformation about the law.90  The discussion then focuses on 
two instances in which “bad law” claims are valid even though an examination 
of formal legal requirements and procedures do not support their assertion.  
Although distinct, each of these two instances reflects the operation of shadow 
systems or rogue standards that are not evident in the formal legal regime.91  
Finally, this section concludes with a brief discussion of situations in which the 
formal legal standard is, in fact, wrong.92 
The taxonomy offered here93 is not intended to be comprehensive.94  In 
addition, “bad law” claims in specific contexts may actually overlap and fall 
within more than one of the categories.  Finally, physician behavior responds 
to environmental influences other than law or fear of legal entanglement, 
including social, ethical, financial, and administrative pressures.95  This 
 
 89. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 90. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 91. See discussion infra Part II.C–D. 
 92. See discussion infra Part II.E. 
 93. See Sandra H. Johnson, Managed Care as Regulation: Functional Ethics for a Regulated 
Environment, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 266 (1995) (using an early version of this analytical 
framework to analyze physicians’ reactions to managed care restrictions). 
 94. For example, some physician “bad law” claims may result from a sort of free-floating 
anxiety or distrust.  See, e.g., David L. Ralston, Pain Management: Texas Legislative and 
Regulatory Update, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 328, 330 (1996) (reporting on a survey of Texas 
physicians in which 68% believed that the medical board’s policy influenced pain treatment, but 
61% reported that they did not know the board’s standards for opioid prescribing). 
 95. See, e.g., BOSK, supra note 26, passim (addressing the influence of social norms and 
social networks on physician accountability); Sandra H. Johnson, The Social, Professional, and 
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taxonomy addresses only claims relating to law, although the influence of 
other environmental factors is accounted for indirectly.96 
A. Dishonest: Scapegoating the Law 
Dishonest “bad law” claims disguise motivations that relate solely to the 
provider’s own interests.  A doctor, for example, may find it easier to tell a 
patient that the law does not allow her to prescribe particular medications 
rather than explaining that the doctor has concerns about the patient’s living 
arrangements or use of alcohol or marijuana; that the doctor thinks the patient 
is manipulative or weak and whiny; or that the doctor is concerned about his or 
her reputation as easily duped or incompetent for providing this treatment to 
this particular patient.97 
Blaming the law is a particularly powerful source of control because it 
diverts attention from the real decisionmaker (the physician) and from the true 
reason for the denial of care (worries about the patient’s characteristics or 
social network concerns).  It does so in a fashion that creates an assumption of 
both good will and powerlessness on the part of the patient’s dear doctor.98 
 
Legal Framework for the Problem of Pain Management in Emergency Medicine, 33 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 741 (2005) (describing ethical and social influences in emergency medicine). 
 96. See, e.g., discussion infra Part III. 
 97. These are common concerns expressed by doctors treating chronic pain patients.  See 
Ann M. Martino, In Search of a New Ethic for Treating Patients with Chronic Pain: What Can 
Medical Boards Do?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 332, 334, 336–41 (1998). 
 98. “Bad law” claims may also be strategic in a larger sense to forge coalitions to support 
change in legal standards. Legislatures apparently have been influenced by claims that doctors 
would not provide emergency care for fear of liability, James Fehlberg, Note, Physicians—Civil 
Liability for Treatment Rendered at the Scene of an Emergency, 1964 WIS. L. REV. 494, 497 n.20 
(1964); would not treat Medicare patients if rates were reduced, William Blanchet & Wayne 
Phillips, Health Care and the Election, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Oct. 2, 2008, at A (arguing 
that Medicare fee reductions blocked by Democrats in Congress would have “forced most of the 
few remaining private Medicare providers to resign”); Mike King, Editorial, Medicare Fix Only 
Delays Inevitable: Halting Pay Cuts to Doctors Was a Start, but a Healthy Debate Awaits Down 
the Road, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 27, 2008, at B6 (“The battle [over reduction of Medicare 
physician fees] pitted doctors against insurance companies, and because of their relationships 
with patients (read: voters), doctors always have more political clout than insurance 
companies.”); Am. Health Line, Am. Political Network, AHL Highlights Recent Efforts by 
Republicans, July 30, 2008, available at WESTLAW, 7/30/2008 APN-HE 8 (reporting that 
Republicans were trying to mend their relationship with “once-loyal allies” in the medical 
profession after supporting a reduction in Medicare fees which ultimately was blocked by 
Democrats); would have to endanger mothers and newborns through early discharge if “drive-
through deliveries” were not outlawed, William H. Dow et al., Differential Effectiveness in 
Patient Protection Laws: What Are the Causes?: An Example from the Drive-Through Delivery 
Laws, 31 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1107, 1107–08 (2006) (noting such statutes were part of the 
“backlash” against managed care); David A. Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is “Consumer 
Protection” Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78 N.C. L. REV. 5, 89 (1999); or would not continue 
to deliver babies if malpractice litigation were not reined in, Douglas A. Kysar et al., Medical 
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B. Misinformed: I Heard It Through the Grapevine 
The doctor may be wrong about what the law requires or prohibits, yet the 
doctor’s understanding of the law is honestly asserted.  Non-expert individuals 
dealing with an extensive body of rules that govern their actions on a daily 
basis do not ordinarily seek legal counsel and instead rely substantially on 
informal, word-of-mouth sources.  At a very early point, the time and expense 
required to secure a more authoritative description of the law simply makes the 
effort impractical and unbearable.  Any rule-oriented system, in which the 
specific rules are not easily accessible to those bound by them, will experience 
a similar informal, underground communication network. 
In their clinical decisionmaking, physicians are more likely to turn to 
physician colleagues for advice rather than referring to journal articles or other 
decision supports.99  This same pattern may operate in their seeking advice as 
to the legal requirements for their practice, crowding out counsel from persons 
with more legal expertise.  Intuitively as well, one has to believe that doctors 
trust other doctors more than they do lawyers.100 
Doctors value clinical experience rather than rules and guidelines in 
treatment decisionmaking.101 This heuristic may operate in the context of 
assessing legal risk and developing responsive behaviors as well.  Thus, the 
stories told by doctors about their own or others’ experiences with the law take 
on even more power in part because they fit the learning and evidence-
gathering patterns generally familiar in medicine.102  In addition, stories told 
within physician groups are likely to amplify extremes in terms of the rendition 
of the facts of the case, as well as the view that the system is offensive and 
unfair.103 
 
Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an Insurance Crisis Is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 785, 812–13 (2006) (analyzing and refuting claims that malpractice premiums were 
causing “provider flight” among obstetricians); Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy Experimentation 
with Administrative Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues Under State Constitutional Law, 45 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59, 60–61 (2008) (describing sources of pressure for malpractice reform).  
See also, for example, Hyman, supra note 69, at 272, referring to doctors’ “mobilization of 
pliable state agencies to do the dirty work.”  Hyman levies similar charges against the legal 
profession. Id. at 273.  Such politically strategic claims may fall within any of the categories 
discussed in this paper. 
 99. Johnson, supra note 30, at 76. 
 100. See supra note 27. 
 101. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 74–76. 
 102. See, e.g., BOSK, supra note 26, at 86–87, 104 (describing the powerful impact of the 
single experience and the “horror stories” shared among physicians as a part of physician 
learning). 
 103. See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-and-Control 
Environmental Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 223, 240–42 (2005) (discussing group 
polarity in a regulatory setting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] TAKING DOCTORS’ “BAD LAW” CLAIMS SERIOUSLY 995 
When the rule is miscommunicated, it will have an impact quite different 
from that intended, possibly to the disadvantage of the patient, the doctor, and 
the public.  Legal standards applicable to medical practice tend to be complex 
or fact-sensitive and, thus, are particularly resistant to accurate mouth-to-
mouth-to-mouth communication on the grapevine.  Yet, this informal 
communication network is the source of choice for physicians for much of 
their information and learning about legal requirements that affect their 
practice. 
C. From the Shadows: Whose Rule Is This Anyway? 
A doctor may honestly and sincerely charge that the “law” restricts good 
care and may accurately understand the “rule,” but may be pointing the finger 
at the wrong target.  In fact, someone else’s rule, and not the law, may be the 
problem.  Health care organizations all have their own informal and formal 
structures that establish standards and procedures internal to the 
organization.104  Common illustrations of these efforts include the work of the 
hospital risk manager;105 the efforts of compliance officers who set 
requirements for billing, and thus, for physician work;106 policies and 
consultations provided by the ethics committee;107 the hospital’s 
pharmaceuticals and therapeutics committee that determines whether specific 
drugs will be available for prescribing;108 the credentialing process that 
increasingly monitors physicians’ practice patterns, patient outcomes, and 
personal behavior;109 the hospital’s quality management and patient 
satisfaction programs that set and enforce expectations for responding 
 
 104. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 
594–625 (2000) (discussing how Medicare and Medicaid operate in private organizations, such as 
nursing homes).  This analysis would also apply to the influence of the Joint Commission on the 
operation of hospitals and physician practices within those institutions.  See id. at 610–15 
(discussing how the Joint Commission enacts standards in tandem with the Health Care Financing 
Administration). 
 105. See Mello et al., supra note 32, at 409 (discussing the role of the hospital risk manager 
when he or she learns that an adverse event has occurred). 
 106. See D. Scott Jones & Paul N. Bind, Jr., Are Compliance Officers Leading the Way When 
It Comes to Quality?, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 43, 47 (discussing the 
work of compliance officers in the context of billing). 
 107. Giles R. Scofield, What Is Medical Ethics Consultation?, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 95, 95 
(2008) (describing the role and significance of ethics consultation). 
 108. Am. Soc’y of Hosp. Pharmacists, ASHP Statement on the Pharmacy and Therapeutics 
Committee and Formulary System, 49 AM. J. HOSP. PHARMACY 648 (1992). 
 109. See Joint Commission, Behaviors that Undermine a Culture of Safety, SENTINEL EVENT 
ALERT, July 9, 2008, available at http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/Sentinel 
EventAlert/sea_40.htm; Eleanor D. Kinney, Hospital Peer Review of Physicians: Does Statutory 
Immunity Increase Risk of Unwarranted Professional Injury?, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 57 
(2009). 
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positively to patients’ and families’ requests regarding medical care;110 and so 
on.  In this environment, it is quite possible that the law the doctor identifies as 
requiring inappropriate care is the organization’s policy, rule, or procedure and 
not any formal legal requirement.  In fact, the influence of law in medicine can 
be crowded out by these private organizational forces that have more direct 
contact with the physician’s day-to-day work.111 
The internal structures that influence, direct, or control physician behavior 
in health care, now frequently referred to as “new governance,”112 are 
pervasive.  These private players operate on a parallel track or in partnership 
with legal regulatory efforts113 and are often hailed as a supplement to the 
public enforcement of legal norms.  The organization’s rule, however, may 
differ from the law. 
Organizational policies, for example, are likely to be designed to put some 
distance between the organization and legal risk,114 avoiding conflicts that may 
or may not bloom into legal issues.115  One might think that if observance of 
legal standards is a good thing, then being especially observant must be just as 
good if not better.  It is not.  Just as the Sunday drivers cruising ten miles 
below the speed limit on a major thoroughfare actually become a safety hazard, 
rules that aim at bringing medical practice well within legal boundaries may be 
hazardous to patients.  Organizational policies that influence doctors toward 
behaving more cautiously may restrict health care access for particular patient 
populations (those viewed as likely to be difficult or to raise risks of adverse 
outcomes or oversight).  They may restrict treatments or medications (with 
 
 110. See MICHAEL E. MILAKOVICH, IMPROVING SERVICE QUALITY 193–97 (1995). 
 111. See generally Carol A. Heimer, Competing Institutions: Law, Medicine, and Family in 
Neonatal Intensive Care, 33 L. & SOC’Y REV. 17, 49–50 (1999) (arguing that unless those who 
monitor day-to-day activities of hospitals translate the law into hospital routines, its effect “is 
much more muted”). 
 112. See Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 139 (2006); See also Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-
Disciplinary Review of Current Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1 (2008) (providing an in-depth 
analysis of governance applying to health care as well as other contexts). 
 113. See generally Peter D. Jacobson, Regulating Health Care: From Self-Regulation to Self-
Regulation, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1165, 1171–73 (2001); Jost, supra note 72, at 827–41 
(providing a history of the concurrent development of public and private regulatory efforts). 
 114. “When the regulated organization cannot determine with a high degree of confidence 
what is required for compliance with a new regulation, several special costs are incurred.  If the 
organization is risk averse or the penalty for noncompliance is high, organizations may 
overcomply.”  Mello et al., supra note 32, at 401–02. 
 115. The hospital’s lawyers are likely to have provided legal counsel for these efforts.  Actual 
legal standards may allow the organization more flexibility than the organization or counsel 
chooses to allow in the organization’s policies.  See discussion infra Part III.  See also Sandra H. 
Johnson & Jesse A. Goldner, Hospitals Broaden Role of In-House Counsel, HEALTH PROGRESS, 
May 1987, at 68 (arguing that hospitals should press counsel on advice concerning legal risk). 
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doctors avoiding those that require pre-approval or the hospital eliminating 
those with black-box warnings).116  They may encourage doctors to provide 
unnecessary care or testing (that which the patient or family demands prior to 
completing the patient satisfaction survey).117 
The context of end-of-life care provides a useful parallel and illustrates the 
significance of the concept of “over-observance” of the law.  
Reconceptualizing continued medical interventions to delay dying as 
“overtreatment” and as much an error as “undertreatment” produced a new 
way of thinking about choices concerning medical treatment at the end of life.  
When continued ventilator support, for example, was considered as merely 
maintaining the status quo and not as a “decision,” only discontinuation of 
ventilator support required that a decision be made.  Only when continued 
ventilator support was reframed as active treatment, and in fact as 
overtreatment, did a substantial choice between two equal and competing 
options present itself where none had existed before.118  So, too, an 
understanding of the costs of “overobservance” of law provides a tool for 
assessing the impact of private organizational activity designed to avoid legal 
risk.119 
Coordination between public enforcement and private regimes can be 
mutually reinforcing in protecting patients.  “Double enforcement,” however, 
can put the public regulatory system out of balance and distort the intended 
relationship between penalty and offense.  For example, a physician and the 
state medical board may agree to resolve an inquiry as to the physician’s 
prescribing practices, without proof of actual violation of standards, by having 
the doctor enroll in a continuing medical education (CME) program.  This may 
be viewed as a very light penalty, if a penalty at all, by the medical board and 
quite appropriate in light of the nature of the board’s inquiry.  On the doctor’s 
part, the agreement to participate in CME may be a rational and practical 
compromise of the dispute over particular practices with the board and one that 
would take the “death penalty” of license revocation off the table.120 
 
 116. Heart-to-Heart Radio Series Program I: Beyond Pain (Claire Schoen produced Jan. 1, 
2004) (transcript available at http://www.prx.org/pieces/5305/transcripts/5305). 
 117. See Liz Kowalczyk, Doctors Don’t Report Colleagues, Errors: Study Finds Practices at 
Odds with Beliefs, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2007, at A1. 
 118. See, e.g., Brief for SSM Health Care System, et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, Cruzan v. Dir., 
Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (No. 88-1503); Thomas Finucane, Thinking About 
Life-Sustaining Treatment Late in the Life of a Demented Person, 35 GA. L. REV. 691, 695 (2001) 
(emphasizing the importance of viewing both overtreatment and undertreatment as serious 
issues). 
 119. James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641, 
1644–45 (2008) (discussing the impact of overcompliance with formal legal standards in the 
context of tort law). 
 120. See Martino, supra note 97, at 340. 
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If, however, the hospital then revokes the doctor’s staff privileges as a 
result of the CME agreement,121 that penalty has been magnified 
exponentially.122  While one might assume that the hospital’s action supports 
the legal effort, it is, in fact, levying a much more serious penalty than the 
public agency may have believed necessary or appropriate.  The heightened 
risks to a doctor contemplating treating particular patients (for example, 
chronic pain patients, pain patients with a history of substance abuse) or 
providing particular treatments (for example, opioids for chronic pain) may 
deter the doctor from those choices.123 
If the doctor is deterred from providing inappropriate or harmful treatment, 
there is no loss and only gain when private organizations magnify the penalty 
levied by the governmental agency.  If, however, the doctor is an early 
adopter124 of newer and perhaps more evidence-based medical knowledge, 
raising the penalties through this “double enforcement” by public and private 
entities prevents patients from receiving effective and necessary care.  In the 
case of pain management, for example, early adopters of new knowledge 
regarding the effectiveness and safety of the long-term use of opioids in higher 
volumes than had been customarily prescribed were frequently investigated by 
the state medical boards.125  The CME compromise can operate as a release 
valve in the regulatory process to create some space for accommodating 
emerging standards and change in medical practice and medical knowledge.  
The CME compromise is not an entirely satisfactory resolution of the 
regulatory challenge to accommodate change, of course, but at least its effect, 
and its threat, is not as dire as it would be if the doctor knew that agreeing to 
CME would result in loss of his livelihood due to termination or limitation by 
the hospital or health plans on which he depended.126  Thus, double 
enforcement by private organizations of public penalties may carry quite 
negative effects as well as the positive effects for which mobilization of private 
organizations in the service of legal standards is usually praised. 
 
 121. Hospitals are required to consult the National Practitioner Data Bank, to which state 
medical boards are required to report disciplinary actions, as a part of the hospital’s credentialing 
process.  Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11131–11137 (2000); see 
ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, HEALTH CARE LAW DESK REFERENCE 41 (2001). 
 122. See Martino, supra note 97, at 340 (reporting incidences of such actions and discussing 
their implications on physician prescribing behavior). 
 123. Id. at 341. 
 124. See, e.g., Shana Campbell Jones et al., The Interoperable Electronic Health Record: 
Preserving Its Promise by Recognizing and Limiting Physician Liability, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
75, 83 (2008) (discussing liability risks of early adopters of electronic health record systems). 
 125. Sandra H. Johnson, Disciplinary Actions and Pain Relief: Analysis of the Pain Relief 
Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 319, 320 (1996). 
 126. But see discussion infra Part II.D (penalties of the process). 
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The interests at stake in establishing private ordering within health care 
institutions do not necessarily represent the breadth of interests at stake in the 
adoption of legal standards.  The enforcement of legal duties and rights carries 
clearly stated formal penalties.  Formal penalties usually take into account the 
seriousness of the violations and weigh a number of competing factors, 
including fairness, proportionality, protection of the public, repeat offenses, the 
potential for rehabilitation, and conflicting substantive regulatory goals.127  The 
severity of the punishment that follows a violation of legal standards figures 
substantially into the deterrent effect of the law with more severe penalties, at 
least theoretically, producing a greater margin of avoidance.  While voluntary 
compliance is the essential goal of legal standards, health care organizations do 
not contribute to this effort when they reinterpret legal requirements in ways 
that alter the balance of risk and benefit and the competing policies in the 
original standard.  More—more caution, more risk-aversion, more penalties—
is not necessarily better.128 
D. From the Shadows, Too: All’s Not Well that Ends Well 
The enforcement process itself also imposes significant penalties in the 
course of identifying violators.  These penalties are distinct from formal 
penalties levied after a conclusive finding that a violation has occurred.  These 
 
 127. See generally Michael A. Simons, Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking 
Sentencing Justice, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303 (2009) (arguing prosecutors should consider 
these punishment theories in assessing appropriate potential sentences for crimes charged).  The 
question of “regulatory balance” in enforcement practices in the context of conflicting goals 
appears in regulatory literature generally and in health care policy in particular.  See, e.g., 
Johnson, supra note 95 (describing questions of regulatory balance in enforcement efforts related 
to controlled substances); Brian Rubens, Common Law Versus Regulatory Fraud: Parsing the 
Intent Requirement of the Felony Penalty Provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 72 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1501, 1529 (2005) (arguing that the judicial requirement of specific intent upsets the 
regulatory balance struck in the statutory fraud provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA)); Jeffrey Rudd, Regulating the Impacts of Engineered Nanoparticles Under TCSA: 
Shifting Authority from Industry to Government, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 215 (2008) 
(recommending that the Environmental Protection Agency must strike the appropriate regulatory 
balance between safety and new product development). 
 128. Private organizations may amplify the penalties of the investigative process (as distinct 
from actual sanctions) by penalizing—formally or informally—those who are investigated but 
against whom ultimately no action is filed or sanction levied.  See Goldner, supra note 74, at 
342–43 (discussing federally mandated scientific misconduct investigations and procedures).  
Goldner describes the results of a survey of researchers accused of misconduct but where no 
misconduct was found, but who nonetheless suffered subsequent penalties, such as loss of 
employment, promotions, or salary increases; ostracism; reduction in research or support staff; 
and other actions.  Id. at 342.  Goldner argues that institutions need to address the issue of private 
penalties for persons investigated but cleared of misconduct charges.  Id. at 343.  See also 
discussion infra Part II.D (penalties of investigations). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1000 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:973 
“penalties of the process”129 exert their own deterrent effect.130  When 
substantial, they will produce avoidance behaviors on the part of those who 
might fall within the investigative net even though the likelihood that they will 
be subject to formal sanctions is nil or close to it. 131 
The deterrence effect of these informal penalties may produce results that 
actually undermine the goals of the formal legal requirements.  Yet, they are all 
but invisible—they make no appearance in the formal description of the 
standards and procedures incorporated in the law.  The best information 
available concerning the operation of this shadow system of enforcement 
comes from the people who experience it, those doctors who claim that there is 
“bad law” causing them to avoid doing the right thing. 
This particular form of “bad law” claim was demonstrated dramatically in 
a 1996 conference focusing on the prescribing of controlled substances for pain 
patients.132  In a small workshop for that conference, the president of the 
Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB), an organization of state medical 
boards, presented the boards’ standards and practices relating to physicians’ 
prescribing opioids for their chronic pain patients.  He argued that the boards’ 
standards and enforcement practices were not impediments to prescribing these 
drugs as they did not target physicians prescribing these medications 
legitimately.  Dr. Kathleen Hoover, a doctor who had been subject to 
disciplinary proceedings in Florida for her prescription of controlled 
substances for her patients in pain, was in the audience.133  Dr. Hoover asked 
the official how he squared his view that the standards and processes used by 
the boards were legitimate and did not impede good care with the fact that the 
Florida board had subjected her to discipline for that very practice.  Noting that 
the Florida board’s penalty ultimately had been overturned by the Florida 
Court of Appeals in Dr. Hoover’s case, he responded that everything had 
turned out alright in the end in her case.134  After two years of expensive and 
 
 129. The classic analysis of the effect of the costs of pursuing adjudication of legal violations 
was studied in the context of criminal prosecutions and plea bargains.  MALCOLM M. FEELEY, 
THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:  HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–201, 
235–43 (1979). 
 130. This section of the paper focuses on the deterrent effect of legal enforcement systems.  
Deterrence is a major goal and effect of regulatory systems; however, significant research and 
theory argues that compliance with legal norms may be stimulated by positive understandings of 
moral or social obligations rather than fear of penalty alone.  See Peter J. May, Compliance 
Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (2004). 
 131. See discussion of investigations infra Part IV.B. 
 132. Am. Soc’y of Law, Med. & Ethics, National Meeting on Legal, Ethical, and Institutional 
Issues in Pain Relief (Nov. 1–2, 1996). 
 133. See Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Admin., 676 So.2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1996). 
 134. He did not make an argument that the disciplinary action was appropriate in her case.  
The Agency for Health Care Administration (Agency) submitted the Board’s recommendation for 
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wrenching litigation contesting the sanctions levied against her, Dr. Hoover did 
not exactly agree.  Furthermore, physicians were quite aware of the litigation 
in Dr. Hoover’s case as well as similar cases in several other states at the time, 
and it hardly altered their risk calculus that the sanctions ultimately were 
overturned by an appellate court.135   
Doctors’ fear of the actions of state medical boards relating to their caring 
for patients in chronic pain focused on the very threshold of disciplinary 
action.  They feared the investigative process itself because of the heavy costs 
it placed on the individual physician.  State medical boards viewed a letter of 
inquiry, asking a doctor to respond to particular issues the board detected in its 
surveillance of the physician’s prescribing,136 as a neutral and non-punitive 
action that doctors who were engaged in legitimate practice had no reason to 
fear.137  Doctors, on the other hand, called that communication the “$10,000 
letter,”138 solely because of the financial costs of responding: many would hire 
an attorney to advise them on how to respond (as they believed that their 
license to practice was at risk) and every doctor would take time away from 
 
disciplinary action to the state’s administrative hearings commission for a hearing, and the 
hearing officer concluded that the agency had failed to meet its burden of proof.  Id. at 1382. 
Despite the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions, the Board disciplined Dr. Hoover, 
including a reprimand, a $4000 fine, mandatory CME on prescribing abusable drugs, and two 
years probation.  Id. 
 135. At the time of the conference, only ten states, including Florida, had statutes that 
addressed the prescription of controlled substances for the treatment of intractable pain, and only 
six of those statutes addressed the concern of disciplinary action.  Chris Stern Hyman, Pain 
Management and Disciplinary Action: How Medical Boards Can Remove Barriers to Effective 
Treatment, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 338, 340 (1996).  Only twelve more states had guidelines or 
regulations on the subject.  Id. at 341.  In 1998, as the result of a working group that included a 
representative from the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics (ASLME) project group 
that developed the 1996 conference, the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) adopted a 
set of model guidelines to encourage state medical boards to reform their standards and practices.  
Sandra H. Johnson, Providing Relief to Those in Pain: A Retrospective on the Scholarship and 
Impact of the Mayday Project, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 15, 16 (2003); see also FED’N OF STATE 
MED. BDS. OF THE U.S., INC., MODEL POLICY FOR THE USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES FOR 
THE TREATMENT OF PAIN (2004) [hereinafter FSMB, MODEL POLICY], available at 
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/2004_grpol_Controlled_Substances.pdf.  By 2002, twenty-three states 
had enacted legislation and more than forty states had adopted policy statements, guidelines, or 
regulations.  Johnson, supra, at 22, 19 n.24. 
 136. See discussion infra Part IV.B (prescription monitoring). 
 137. In a survey of medical board personnel, one commented that “[d]octors like to cry foul 
anytime we inquire about anything” but that the board’s obligation to protect patients justified 
inquiries.  Diane E. Hoffmann & Anita J. Tarzian, Achieving the Right Balance in Oversight of 
Physician Opioid Prescribing for Pain: The Role of State Medical Boards, 31 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 21, 32 (2003). 
 138. Heart-to-Heart Radio Series Program I: Beyond Pain, supra note 116. 
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their practice to review charts and prepare responses.139  The penalties 
embedded in the process, including disruption of practice, damage to 
reputation and to necessary business relationships, and stress and shame, were 
so severe that it became clear that “[t]he most effective antidote to the 
physicians’ fear [was] ensuring that state medical boards [were] not 
investigating . . . physicians who treat pain appropriately.”140 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the power of the 
investigative process standing alone to alter physician behavior in Conant v. 
Walters.141  In that case, the court considered the federal government’s policy 
of investigating California doctors who discussed the medical use of marijuana 
with their patients after the state had legalized its use for such purposes.142  
Patients and doctors challenged the federal government’s policy as a violation 
of the First Amendment and sought and received a permanent injunction 
prohibiting the federal government from “threatening” and investigating such 
physicians.143  The suit did not challenge any sanctions against specific 
 
 139. See Linda Pembrook, How to Survive a State Board Investigation, PAIN MED. NEWS, 
May–June 2007, at 1, 1, 10, for a discussion between a doctor and lawyer regarding the conduct 
of a medical board during an inquiry into the doctor’s prescribing practices, in which ultimately 
all potential charges were dismissed by the board.  The doctor describes the notice that gave her 
fourteen days to prepare and submit “certified true copies of the [requested] medical records,” a 
summary of those records, and a notarized affidavit.  Id. at 10.  Seven days had already passed by 
the time the letter was received.  Id.  Summarizing the records posed a challenge as the inquiry 
letter did not specify any particular concern.  The doctor reports that she needed to seek counsel 
to answer the following questions: 
[W]hat constitutes a certified true copy?  Can I send copies of copies?  If I sign an 
affidavit certifying that these are copies of copies, but I’m not sure of that fact, did I just 
perjure myself? Do I really have to respond within 14 days?  If I write a summary of what 
happened, should I write a little or a lot?  Should I account for what I did, what the nurses 
did, what the patient did?  Should I point out the patient’s deficiencies? . . .  And why do 
they want my billing records? 
Id.  The Pembrook article also notes that malpractice insurance ordinarily does not cover the costs 
related to medical board inquiries or disciplinary actions.  Id.  See also Martino, supra note 97, at 
340 (“To be investigated or sanctioned by a board could result in a loss of stature, reputation, 
institutional privileges, or access to insurance panels.”). 
 140. Hyman, supra note 135, at 338 (emphasis added). 
 141. 309 F.3d 629, 638–39 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 142. Id. at 632–33. 
 143. Id. at 633–34. This lawsuit was narrowly targeted to reach only the case of physicians 
discussing or recommending but not prescribing or distributing marijuana in a clinical setting.  Id. 
at 632, 634.  In United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483, 486 
(2001), the Supreme Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act classification of marijuana as a 
Schedule-I drug that cannot be prescribed legally, against a claim that the Act implied a “medical 
necessity” defense that would allow physicians to prescribe the drug for patients in certain 
circumstances.  In Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005), the Supreme Court upheld the 
Controlled Substances Act as within the scope of the power of the federal government under the 
Commerce Clause. 
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physicians; it merely challenged the investigative process.144  The injunction 
issued by the District Court prohibited the federal government from “initiating 
any investigation solely on” the basis of “a recommendation for the use of 
medical marijuana based on a sincere medical judgment.”145  The Ninth Circuit 
upheld the injunction based on the impact of threatened investigation on 
practicing doctors.146 
Reporting requirements, which generally would indicate heightened 
prospects for investigation, can themselves alter behavior.  The case of the use 
of physical restraints in nursing homes illustrates this point.  Rates of 25–85% 
of residents in restraints were not uncommon among nursing homes in the late 
1980s.147  No government regulation required that nursing homes physically 
restrain their ambulatory residents to prevent them from falling or wandering, 
but falls and unsupervised departures from the facility required, at a minimum, 
that an incident report be filed with the regulatory agency and could trigger 
government investigation or inquiry.148  Tying a patient to a bed or a chair did 
not require that an incident report be filed nor would it cause any serious 
inquiry from the government agency.  Simply doing the bad thing—restraining 
the resident—became the course that was not penalized by the system.  Such a 
 
 144. Conant, 309 F.3d at 633.  The federal government agreed with the plaintiffs that a doctor 
who merely discussed marijuana with his patients would not violate federal law (the Controlled 
Substances Act), and the plaintiffs agreed with the federal government that doctors who actually 
prescribed or dispensed the drug would be in violation of the Act.  Id. at 633–34.  In essence, the 
suit concerned whether a recommendation, standing alone, violated the Act and whether a policy 
of investigating physicians who merely discussed or recommended marijuana to their patients 
violated the First Amendment.  Id. at 632. 
 145. Id. at 634 (quoting Conant v. McCaffrey, No. C97-00139 WHA, 2000 WL 1281174, at 
*16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000), aff’d sub nom. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2002)).  
The appellate court’s majority opinion notes that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
agreed that physicians who recommended marijuana to their patients should “have a genuine fear 
of losing” their prescribing permit.  Id. at 639.  Judge Kozinski, in his concurring opinion, quoted 
the report submitted by an expert who said that “[a] physician’s career can be effectively 
destroyed merely by the fact that a governmental body has investigated his or her practice.”  Id. at 
640 n.2 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 146. See Conant, 309 F.3d at 638–39.  See also Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 684–
85 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), where the court awarded plaintiff nurses and physicians a declaratory 
judgment that the medical practice act was not violated by the work of the nurse practitioners in a 
situation where the board had simply “threatened to order the . . . nurses and physicians” to prove 
that the nurses were not guilty of the unauthorized practice of medicine.  The board had taken no 
formal action against the nurses (or against the doctors for aiding and abetting the unauthorized 
practice of medicine in their work with the nurses), but the doctors reasonably feared that they 
would be so charged and argued that they would discontinue working with the nurses if the threat 
persisted.  See id. at 684 & n.1 (emphasis added). 
 147. Laurence Z. Rubenstein et al., Falls in the Nursing Home, 121 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
442, 449 (1994). 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 15–20. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1004 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:973 
state of affairs communicated an unmistakable message: What did the 
regulations require?  They required restraints. 149  It hardly mattered that no 
government regulation could be found to support that commonly held belief.150 
Penalties of the process are magnified when enforcement employs the 
accoutrements of criminal prosecution.151  Law enforcement personnel 
understand the power of public arrest, handcuffing, seizure of property, and 
disruption of business to dramatize the government’s power and the 
grievousness of the personal misconduct.  The arrest ritual communicates a 
powerful message to potential perpetrators: be afraid of us; be very afraid.  For 
physicians at least, the “be very afraid” message is heard by good and bad 
alike, and it would not be surprising if the good (as well as the bad) alter their 
behavior accordingly, and not in a desirable direction. 
 
 149. One of the significant changes in federal regulations to address the excessive use of 
restraints was the inclusion of the percentage of residents physically restrained as an element in 
the Minimum Data Set required to be reported to the federal government by each nursing home.  
See Katherine Berg et al., Identification and Evaluation of Existing Nursing Home Quality 
Indicators, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Summer 2002, at 19, 20–21, 32–33.  The more recent 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Nursing Home Quality Initiative includes the rate of 
restraint use as a quality indicator.  See Jennifer L. Hilliard, The Nursing Home Quality Initiative: 
Shift in Policy, Shift in Paradigm, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 41, 52–53 (2005). 
 150. Even after federal regulations were adopted to restrict the use of physical restraints in 
nursing homes, the practice persisted.  According to providers, concerns about liability risks were 
at least a partial motivation for the use of physical restraints.  See, e.g., Joseph Francis, Letter to 
the Editor, Using Restraints on the Elderly Because of Fear of Litigation, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
870, 870 (1989) (describing a newsletter from a malpractice insurance carrier concerning 
malpractice claims for falls by elderly patients and addressing the use of restraints to prevent 
those falls).  An empirical study of a claims-filed database, the incidence of claims against 
nursing homes generally, and court opinions addressing liability for falls and wandering, proved 
that the liability concerns were unfounded.  Sandra H. Johnson, The Fear of Liability and the Use 
of Restraints in Nursing Homes, 18 J.L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 263, 264–65 (1990).  In addition, 
emerging actions for injuries due to the inappropriate use of physical restraints counterbalanced 
the risk of liability for falls.  Id. at 267.  Eventually, rates of nursing home residents in restraints 
declined so that rates of no more than 5% are common, and many facilities aim at 0% restraint 
use.  See Bruce C. Vladeck, The Past, Present and Future of Nursing Home Quality, 275 JAMA 
425, 425 (1996) (noting the reduction in the use of restraints after the regulations were in place).  
Of course, the effort to reduce restraint use involved more than changing the law.  See, e.g., 
Catherine Hawes et al., The OBRA-87 Nursing Home Regulations and Implementation of the 
Resident Assessment Instrument: Effects on Process Quality, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC’Y 977, 
978, 984 (1997) (citing the overall need to reduce “[p]oor care practices,” which included the use 
of physical restraints).  The fact that the reform effort involved more than legal change does not 
alter the fact that claimed “bad law” was influential in perpetuating the practice. 
 151. See Burris et al., supra note 11, at 7–8 (discussing criminal sanctions associated with 
prescribing and dispensing sterile syringes to injection drug users) ; Diane E. Hoffmann, Treating 
Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse: Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control 
Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 233 (2009) (“In the course of the 
last decade federal and state prosecutors have arrested and charged several hundred physicians 
with criminal violations related to their prescribing of opioid analgesics.”). 
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The decision of what has to be reported; whom to investigate; when to 
make an inquiry; how to dramatize an arrest—are all powerful enforcement 
tools in themselves.152  These mid-level policy decisions can upset the balance 
sought to be achieved in the formal standard-setting process, but they are 
usually undocumented and rarely studied.  In particular, reporting requirements 
and investigations do more than produce raw material for oversight and 
sanctions.  Standing alone and apart from the decision to sanction, they exert 
an influence on physician behavior.  Thus, they create a shadow system or 
rogue standards that doctors experience and report in “bad law” claims that can 
so easily be dismissed as either insincere153 or misinformed.154 
E. Differential Diagnosis: The Rules Are Wrong 
Sometimes physicians’ claims that the legal standard is bad are correct: the 
rules are wrong.  The doctors are not dishonest or mistaken; and the formal 
rule is not being perverted by a shadow system: it is just wrong.155 
This certainly was the case with physician complaints that state medical 
boards were using the wrong standards in investigating and penalizing doctors 
for prescribing opioids over the long term and in larger amounts than used 
traditionally for patients with chronic non-cancer pain.156  After an 
investigation that included review of all news articles over a two-year period, 
phone and written surveys of state medical board members concerning 
standards and practices, review of written board policies, and review of statutes 
and judicial opinions, we found that, in fact, the rules were wrong.157  Medical 
boards did sanction doctors for prescribing opioids appropriately for this 
patient population.158 
 
 152. See discussion of recommended adjustments to these decisions infra Part IV. 
 153. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 154. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 155. Although this analysis is a differential diagnosis in that other causes for the “bad law” 
claim are ruled out, “bad law” claims can overlap.  Some of the examples discussed in this 
section, for example, also appear in other sections.  Because the categories in this taxonomy are 
intended to focus responses as well as identify problems, however, it is useful to identify each of 
the categories into which a particular situation may fall. 
 156. See, for example, Hoover v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 676 So.2d 1380, 
1381–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996), in which the only evidence against the doctor who was 
sanctioned for her prescribing of pain medication was provided by two physicians who testified 
that they never cared for patients in chronic pain and who admitted that they had not reviewed her 
patient’s medical records, but who testified based on the pharmacy printouts alone that she had 
prescribed “excessive, perhaps lethal amounts” of the drugs and a “tremendous number of pills.”  
See text accompanying notes 132–135. 
 157. Johnson, supra note 125. 
 158. Symposium, Appropriate Management of Pain: Addressing the Clinical, Legal, and 
Regulatory Barriers, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 285 (1996). 
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The conclusion that the rules are wrong can rest on a number of pragmatic 
and normative bases.  The error, for example, may be a matter of the 
knowledge base on which the rule relies; a matter of the ethical principles it 
adopts; or a matter of the perspective which the rule assumes.  In each of these, 
good law can become bad law just as good medicine can become bad 
medicine. 
Rules that may have been right become wrong when the knowledge base in 
medicine shifts.159  For health care regulation, the challenges of changes in 
technology receive considerable attention, but advances in knowledge, 
especially when those advances proceed in fits and starts, present significant 
challenges as well.160  Rules prohibiting or penalizing the prescription of 
opioids for chronic pain, for example, were based in part on false notions that 
they are highly addictive and probably lethal.161  The reporting system 
requiring reports of falls but not of the use of restraints162 relied on mistaken 
but commonly held knowledge that restraints made people safe when instead 
even apparently benign restraints like bedrails caused significant injuries.163 
Underlying ethical principles that support customary practice can also 
come to be viewed as mistaken as applied in particular situations.  For 
example, in the case of pain management, the customary practice of 
withholding effective medication was based on strongly held beliefs that the 
drugs were addicting.  Even for terminally ill cancer patients, concerns over 
addicting the patient caused doctors to withhold necessary pain medicine with 
 
 159. Changes in social knowledge also may reveal how a rule is wrong.  For example, a 
recent investigation, by the Los Angeles Times, of the use of presumed consent for tissue retrieval 
revealed that it was applied in a fashion that caused a significant race-based disparate impact, 
with the vast majority of “donors” coming from racial minorities.  See Michele Goodwin, 
Deconstructing Legislative Consent Law: Organ Taking, Racial Profiling, & Distributive Justice, 
6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶¶ 1–7 (2001), http://www.vjolt.net/vol6/issue1/v6i1a02-Goodwin.html;  
see also Burris et al., supra note 11 (finding that state laws which make “physicians and 
pharmacists the gatekeepers to syringe access” may be wrong in light of evidence regarding 
benefits of needle exchanges). 
 160. For a discussion of this problem in relation to the regulation of off-label prescribing, see 
Johnson, supra note 30. 
 161. Russell K. Portenoy, Opioid Therapy for Chronic Nonmalignant Pain: Clinicians’ 
Perspective, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 296, 296, 299–303 (1996). 
 162. See supra text accompanying notes 147–50. 
 163. Neville E. Strumpf & Lois K. Evans, Physical Restraints of the Hospitalized Elderly: 
Perceptions of Patients and Nurses, 37 NURSING RES. 132, 132 (1988); see also Johnson supra 
note 150, at 263 (“The risks of using restraints on elderly patients are serious and substantial.  
These risks include strangulation, medical ailments caused by immobility, and increased agitation 
. . . [and] can lead to misdiagnosis due to masking of symptoms . . . . ”); Morning Edition: 
Bedrails Can Cause Deaths in Frail, Elderly (NPR radio broadcast June 29, 2006), available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5519589 (discussing FDA guidelines 
aimed at curtailing physical entrapment of patients in bedrails used on hospital beds). 
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tragic results.164  Eventually, that beneficence norm as applied to the terminally 
ill was challenged, with stronger arguments made that the relief of pain was 
morally superior to the avoidance of addiction in a dying person.165  Once the 
ethic changed, doctors then began to provide the drugs in larger doses.166  As 
more people lived with cancer over a longer time, a body of evidence 
regarding long-term and higher-dose use of opioids developed.  This new 
learning indicated that the risk of addiction of patients in pain was very remote, 
ultimately benefiting chronic pain patients as well.167  In the case of physical 
restraints, the normative framework for care of nursing home residents gave 
primacy to keeping the residents safe.168  Developing a new framework, one 
that valued functioning and social interaction, was required to offset a 
generation of normative training that had encouraged nurses and doctors to 
engage in restraining patients despite the distress experienced by patient and 
caregiver alike.169 
Perspective conflicts are played out in the public policy arena where 
stakeholders argue for competing notions of good policy.  Perspective is more 
than rational argument about data or values; it emerges from one’s experience 
or empathy. 170  For example, if one experiences or empathizes with suffering 
caused by unnecessary pain, one favors increasing easy access to effective pain 
medications and is likely to have more tolerance for the risks of addiction and 
diversion.  If the miseries of addiction inform one’s perspective, it is likely to 
lead to a rule with very low tolerance for the use of narcotics that can be 
 
 164. June L. Dahl & David E. Joranson, The Wisconsin Cancer Pain Initiative, in 16 
ADVANCES IN PAIN RESEARCH AND THERAPY 499, 499 (K.M. Foley et al. eds., 1990). 
 165. Moral claims to aggressive pain management in end-of-life care have their parallel in 
law.  See Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide but a Constitutional 
Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1235–36 (1997). 
 166. Bridget M. Kuehn, Opioid Prescriptions Soar: Increase in Legitimate Use as Well as 
Abuse, 297 JAMA 249, 249–50 (2007).  There are still significant concerns over the inadequacy 
of pain management at the end of life.  See Kathryn L. Tucker, The Chicken and the Egg: The 
Pursuit of Choice for a Human Hastened-Death as a Catalyst for Improved End-of-Life Care; 
Improved End-of-Life Care as a Precondition for Legalization of Assisted Dying, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 355, 375 (2004) (demanding accountability for the failure to “treat pain 
adequately” during end-of-life care); see also Jill L. Loeb, Pain Management in Long-Term Care, 
99 AM. J. NURSING 48 (1999) (discussing factors that contribute to the “high incidence of 
inadequately controlled pain” among residents in long-term-care facilities). 
 167. See Portenoy, supra note 161, at 303. 
 168. Rosalie A. Kane & Robert L. Kane, Long-Term Care: Variations on a Quality 
Assurance Theme, 25 INQUIRY 132, 135–36 (1988). 
 169. Strumpf & Evans, supra note 163, at 132, 136–37. 
 170. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Bruce Hoffman, Challenging Medicine: Law, Resistance, 
and the Cultural Politics of Childbirth, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 125, 158, 162–63 (2005) 
(describing empirical studies of legislative processes concerning recognition of midwifery 
demonstrating that legislators’ personal experience with midwives or childbirth greatly influenced 
their position on proposed legislation). 
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addictive or can be diverted.  If one assumes the perspective of persons dying 
of preventable infectious disease, it is likely to produce a stronger claim for 
distribution of sterile needles to prevent transmission.  If, on the other hand, 
one is drawn to the suffering of addiction, the distribution of sterile needles 
might be resisted as removing a real or symbolic obstacle to illegal drug use.171  
Of course, these perspectives may not present true conflict, but instead may be 
reconcilable given appropriate information and resources for response.  In most 
cases, however, perspective differences do at some point remain at odds, and a 
value choice as to what degree or direction of error is acceptable will have to 
be made.172 
Even government agencies may not share the same perspective.  For 
example, as the FSMB was adjusting medical board standards and practices to 
accommodate greater access to pain medication, the federal Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) was establishing stricter standards, criminalization, and 
aggressive prosecution.173  This conflict persists because of a difference in 
perspective of the two agencies.  The FSMB identifies its mission as promoting 
good medicine.174 The DEA identifies its mission as preventing the abuse and 
diversion of drugs.175  The problem is not confined to morally charged areas of 
law, such as drug policy, of course.176  In all cases, however, when government 
agencies are engaged in a conflict over the appropriate standard or policy, the 
subjects of their regulation have to view one of the rules as wrong.  In fact, one 
may argue that truly conflicting regulations are by definition wrong. 
 
 171. See Burris et al., supra note 11. 
 172. Bill Sage persuasively argues that the reductionist tendency to personalize health reform 
issues inappropriately narrows the focus to the physician-patient dyad and excludes consideration 
of collective costs and benefits.  Sage, supra note 67, at 500. 
 173. See, e.g., Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’y Gens. to Karen P. Tandy, Adm’r, DEA 
(Jan. 19, 2005) (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal) (regarding the DEA’s 
revocation of its posted FAQ that indicated the agency’s agreement with the standards used by 
state medical boards and its move toward criminalizing physician prescribing, stating that “state 
and federal policies are diverging with respect to the relative emphasis on ensuring the 
availability of prescription pain medications to those who need them”). 
 174. Fed’n of State Med. Bds., Mission Vision, Core Values and Goals, http://www.fsmb.org/ 
mission.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). 
 175. U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA Briefs & Background, Drug Policy, DEA 
Mission Statement, http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/mission.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2009) 
 176. See Mello et al., supra note 32, at 381 (“Uncoordinated pluralistic regulation may result 
in overlapping and conflicting mandates.”). 
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III.  RESPONDING TO PHYSICIANS’ FEARS OF LEGAL RISK 
Physicians’ claims that law is compelling bad medicine often generate a 
response aimed at relieving their fears and reducing or managing the legal risk, 
real or perceived, so that doctors can freely engage in the socially desirable 
behaviors threatened by the operation of the putative bad law.  This section 
examines four of the most common responses to physician complaints about 
bad law.  The responses selected for discussion below include redoubling 
educational efforts to relieve doctors’ concerns; enacting immunity legislation 
addressing the specific source of risk; establishing legal safe harbors; and 
eliminating asymmetry.177 
Each of these responses, in theory, should work to relieve physicians of the 
fear of legal entanglement that they report leads them to make different 
medical decisions than they otherwise would and should have.  These common 
responses, however, are relatively ineffective in achieving their intended goal.  
In fact, in some circumstances, the efforts to quell physicians’ legal concerns 
may produce negative outcomes of their own.  As the following sections 
demonstrate, however, the failure of these efforts does not in itself prove that 
the original complaint was dishonest or misinformed. 
A. Education 
An assessment of particular legal requirements and their implementation 
may provide convincing evidence that physicians’ fears of the law in a 
particular practice context are based on misinformation or misunderstanding.  
The first and most common response in this situation is simply to tell the 
doctors that this is so, to engage in educational activities to allay their concerns 
and assure them that they can provide good medical care without fear.  These 
efforts are extraordinarily common in health law.  As an educator, I am hardly 
one to argue that they are not very effective—but they probably are not. 
Elsewhere, I have written about the weak impact of didactic forms of 
continuing medical education upon physician practices.178  Physicians absorb 
 
 177. Legislatures and regulators have adopted other responses to physicians’ “bad law” 
claims, including the adoption of strong presumptions of legal compliance as in the context of 
informed consent.  See supra text accompanying notes 36–47.  Furthermore, some claims of bad 
law asserted by physicians are really “there ought to be a law” claims in which the doctors argue 
that the legislature should act to protect them and their patients from harm worked by private 
ordering.  See generally Diane E. Hoffmann, Physicians Who Break the Law, 53 ST. LOUIS L.J. 
1049, 1084–88 (2009).  Significant examples of such claims have produced legislation regarding 
managed care, including state laws against “drive-through deliveries”; laws prohibiting health 
plans from terminating doctors for “advocating” for patients; and laws requiring health plans to 
pay for emergency services without prior authorization. 
 178. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 30, at 77–81; see also Lars Noah, Medicine’s 
Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 
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the information transmitted in such programs, but do not conform their 
treatment decisions to this new information.179 There is no reason to think that 
education about legal standards would fare better in changing physician legal-
risk-avoidance behavior.  The educational techniques that have a proven effect 
in altering physician behavior, (such as multiple contacts between instructor 
and student following a learn-work-learn sequence; information that is 
provided at the exact point of an expressed need to know; comparative 
information on the behavior of other physicians; follow up with personal phone 
calls; and proctoring and shadowing)180 are not the ones we generally use for 
legal education of physicians. 
Even dismissing the data about physician learning generally, one is left 
with the substantial problem of designing content that would actually assuage 
physicians’ fears of the risk of legal entanglement.  The task of designing such 
an educational effort quickly reveals characteristics within the law, including 
its indeterminacy and the multiple perspectives emerging from attorneys’ role 
identification, which doctors complaining of bad law may experience as 
threatening rather than comforting. 
First, the analysis of the content and application of legal standards to 
medical practice requires some skill.181  There are few simple yes-or-no 
answers.182  Where legal requirements are at all dependent on the particular 
facts of the case, understanding what the law requires, or rather will require,183 
calls for the exercise of significant professional skill and judgment.  Is this case 
 
ARIZ. L. REV. 373 (2002) (discussing the “horizontal process” by which medical professionals 
learn and share information and its effects on law). 
 179. Dave Davis et al., Impact of Formal Continuing Medical Education, 282 JAMA 867, 
873 (1999) (basing its conclusion that such programs “have little or no role to play” in changing 
physician practice on a meta-analysis of studies on the effect of didactic CME). 
 180. Id. at 870–71.  These methods are used in pharmaceutical detailing.  See Wayne Kondro, 
Academic Drug Detailing: An Evidence-Based Alternative, 176 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 429, 430 
(2007).  They also bear similarities to ethics consultation in hospitals, which operates as both a 
problem-solving intervention for difficult treatment decisions and an educational opportunity for 
the health care professionals whose cases are subject to consultative services. 
 181. See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Innovation in Public 
Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 1110 & n.106 
(2009). 
 182. Sandra H. Johnson, Five Easy Pieces: Motifs in Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 131, 
134 (2004); Johnson & Goldner, supra note 115, at 68 (advising hospitals on the limitations of 
legal advice). 
 183. See Louis M. Brown & Thomas L. Shaffer, Toward a Jurisprudence for the Law Office, 
17 AM. J. JURIS. 125, 133–34 (1972), in an early work on “preventive law,” describing the 
relationship of law and fact and distinguishing the “fact-law” analysis used to identify rights and 
duties after an event has occurred and the “law-fact” analysis used to make decisions in advance 
of legal disputes.  In the litigation context, the facts are “cold” or “hard,” indicating that they can 
not be changed; in the law office context, the facts are “hot” or “soft,” indicating that there are 
decisions to be made in which the law is not necessarily the determining factor.  Id. at 134. 
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just like the case that the courts have already decided, or is it different in some 
significant way?184 
Furthermore, the infrequency of written judicial opinions and authoritative 
case law usually presents a connect-the-dots puzzle for legal counsel in which 
some important dots are missing.  For example, even in an area such as 
discontinuing treatment at the end of life,185 where there are enough judicial 
opinions to provide the fodder for an extensive treatise,186 any one state may 
have no more than one or two such cases.  In fact, with few exceptions,187 this 
is the reality for most states.  Take, for example, the state of Missouri.  
Lawyers in this state have two cases,188 and no substantive statutes,189 on 
which to base their judgments as to what the law in Missouri requires of 
physicians in providing or withholding treatment from incompetent patients in 
the absence of an advance directive.  The only case to have reached the state’s 
supreme court, Cruzan v. Harmon,190 involved a patient in persistent vegetative 
state where the treatment at issue was nutrition and hydration.  Do the 
standards in that case—that clear and convincing evidence of the patient’s 
choice is required, and is adequate for withdrawal of treatment—extend to 
cases where the patient is minimally conscious or suffering?  To cases where 
the treatment is chemotherapy?  To cases where the patient was never 
competent to make a decision?  How does a significant change in the 
composition of the court factor into our advice?  Lawyers routinely refer to the 
case law of other states, but deciding whether Missouri’s courts will follow the 
courts of other states requires educated guessing.191 
 
 184. The discussion in this subsection addresses the analysis of case law only as an 
illustration.  Of course, case analysis alone is an inadequate methodology for developing any 
meaningful description of what the law is.  Sage, supra note 82, at 61.  See generally Burris et al., 
supra note 181, at 1142–47. 
 185. Other similar issues arise with the physician’s duty to warn third parties of imminent 
danger presented by a patient, an exception to the physician’s duty of confidentiality.  See 7 
MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 7A-5 (2d. ed. 1998). 
Once again, the rule is extremely fact-sensitive, and written court opinions in any one state are 
few in number or nonexistent.  Id. 
 186. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-
LIFE DECISIONMAKING § 12.01 n.1 (3d. ed. 2008) (describing end-of-life case law among the 
states). 
 187. Id.  California, New York, and Florida are among the exceptions. 
 188. In re Warren, 858 S.W. 2d 263 (Mo. App. 1993); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 
(Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
 189. Cf. MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.040 (West 2007) (providing only for written designation of 
an agent for decisionmaking); MO. ANN. STAT. § 459.010 (providing only for a written living 
will).  The state has no legislation providing for surrogate decisionmaking for an incompetent 
patient without an advance directive. 
 190. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d. 408. 
 191. In fact, the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the work of the vast majority of the courts 
in other states in its holding in Cruzan.  See Sandra H. Johnson, From Medicalization to 
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Deciding what the law is in such situations requires prognostication, and 
reasonable and competent attorneys can disagree.192  Attorneys, therefore, 
present a calculation of risk, using terms like “highly unlikely” and “probably 
not.”  It is hardly ever the case that lawyers can tell doctors: “I assure you that 
you have nothing to be concerned about from the law.  It is completely on your 
side.  You are safe.”  Lawyers are trained to root out any possible risk in a 
planned action and generally communicate that sense of heightened risk.193  
So, instead, what doctors often hear lawyers say is: “Well, anyone with a filing 
fee can sue you, but they are not going to win.”  This consolation—intended to 
inject humor and reality into a situation that a lawyer can see is based on fears 
of nearly nonexistent eventualities—has to ring hollow to anyone who has 
been the defendant in any suit, even one that is eventually dismissed.  Instead 
of reassurance, one could understand that this phrase would be heard as 
confirmation of the unpredictability of the legal hammer. 
Furthermore, law does not speak with one voice.  Lawyers assume specific 
roles in the health care environment (e.g., defense or plaintiff malpractice 
litigator; prosecutor or regulator; academic; in-house counsel), and the content 
and tenor of educational programs depend on the role identification of the 
speaker.  In the classic dichotomy, for example, the hospital’s or doctor’s 
malpractice attorney is likely to tell quite a different story about the risk of 
malpractice liability for particular decisions than will the law faculty member 
invited to give the “law talk.”194  The fraud prosecutor or the attorney for the 
medical board is likely to want to communicate a message of reasonableness in 
their exercise of discretion, but maintain a strong emphasis on deterrence.  
Threats against the bad apples in the profession are internalized by the 
audience of good doctors who identify with colleagues in trouble and see a fine 
line between themselves and these other doctors.195 
At times, the message even from a single legal voice is deeply conflicting.  
Medical boards, for example, typically have used their newsletters to announce 
new policies or issue statements to encourage physicians to provide effective 
 
Legalization to Politicization: O’Connor, Cruzan, and Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21 
CONN. L. REV. 685, 695–96 (1989). 
 192. Thaddeus Mason Pope, for example, takes issue with nearly every earlier attempt to 
describe the law as it applies to medical futility.  Thaddeus Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive 
Euthanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 
MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR, 229, 238–41 (2008). 
 193. David Maister, The Trouble with Lawyers, AM. LAWYER, Apr. 2006, at 97, 100 
(“Probabilities do not seem to influence the discussion, only possibilities.  There is no greater 
condemnation in legal discourse than to describe something as risky.”). 
 194. See KAPP, supra note 24, at 18. 
 195. Bosk noted, for example, that “[s]urgeons are loathe to judge the technical performance 
of others” because of a heightened sensitivity to the essential uncertainty of the practice of 
medicine.  BOSK, supra note 26, at 173. 
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opioid treatment to patients in pain.  In the same issue of that newsletter, 
however, they might have a piece on their interest in looking at physicians who 
are not vigilant about drug diversion.196  They also have published lists of 
physicians disciplined, many of whom were disciplined for “prescribing 
abuse” related to controlled substances, without any further explanation that 
would show that the boards actually were using their new pain policy 
statements. 
Efforts to repeatedly assure physicians that there is little legal risk may 
heighten rather than reduce anxiety.  To the extent that physicians form their 
understanding of legal requirements and legal risks from dramatizations in 
newspapers, in industry newsletters, or in stories told by colleagues, telling 
them that the information is false may not dislodge the power of the 
narrative.197  Doctors were not relieved, for example, to read the DEA’s 
statement, The Myth of the Chilling Effect: Doctors Operating Within Bounds 
of Accepted Medical Practice Have Nothing to Fear from DEA.198  In this 2003 
document, the DEA declared that they hardly ever arrested doctors, and 
reported statistics that showed that out of nearly one million registrants, only 
557 had been investigated; only 34 physicians had been arrested by the agency; 
and only 441 had been sanctioned in any formal fashion during the first three 
quarters of that year.199  At the same time, the agency was pursuing an 
infamous criminal prosecution seeking a twenty-five year prison sentence 
against Dr. William Hurwitz, whose story was well-known among physicians 
treating pain patients, for his prescribing of controlled substances.200  The 
 
 196. The Texas State Board of Medical Examiners had adopted a policy to encourage 
physicians to prescribe adequate controlled substances for the treatment of chronic pain, but its 
newsletter instead published an article on “Narcotic Drug Prescribing” that stated that it was 
“obligated by statute to . . . investigate complaints alleging that the licensee is prescribing . . . 
what could be excessive quantities of drugs to persons who may be addicted to the medications.”  
Ralston, supra note 94, at 328 (quoting Narcotic Drug Prescribing, MED. BD. REP. (Tex. State 
Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, Austin, Tex.), Fall/Winter 1988, at 6).  In a later newsletter, the Board 
stated on the front page that “[t]he Board does not wish to inhibit the proper treatment of pain.  
However, the Board will continue to be concerned about the inappropriate use of narcotics in 
non-malignant conditions . . . .”  Id. (quoting Narcotics and Pain Relief, MED. BD. REP. (Tex. 
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, Austin, Tex.), Spring/Summer 1992, at 1).  The newsletter did not 
mention the legislature’s newly enacted intractable pain act at all.  Id. 
 197. See discussion supra Part II.B; see also, KAPP, supra note 24, at 12–14 (describing the 
influence of these sources of information in leading doctors to vastly overestimate their risk of 
being sued). 
 198. News Release, DEA, The Myth of the “Chilling Effect”: Doctors Operating Within 
Bounds of Accepted Medical Practice Have Nothing to Fear from DEA (Oct. 30, 2003), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr103003.html. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Hoffmann, supra note 151, at 245–50. 
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power of the Hurwitz narrative, carried on the back of distrust of the DEA,201 
displaced the potential persuasive authority of the DEA’s data-driven 
statement.202 
In the medical setting, doctors hear about legal risk from colleagues.203  
Counterintuitively, the more that lawyers tell doctors that what they have heard 
is untrue, the more the untrue stories may be viewed as accurate.  Research on 
the persistence of false rumors indicates that refutations of untruths have a 
perverse effect.  Persons hearing refutations of the false information actually 
have a higher retention rate for the false information as true than those who 
have heard it denied less often.204  In a similar fashion, there is some evidence 
that a message that focuses on the bad apples and on noncompliance as 
justification for government action may actually induce higher levels of 
noncompliance.205  Furthermore, reassurance from the domain of law is filtered 
through medicine’s distrust of law.  Doctors do not trust the law or the legal 
system to be fair, predictable, or appropriate as it applies to medical practice.  
This deep distrust forms a cultural norm that influences how lawyers’ 
educational efforts about legal requirements will be interpreted and 
internalized or rejected in medical practice.206 
B. Immunity 
One of the more familiar legislative responses to physician-reported fears 
of legal risks is statutory immunity.  The Good Samaritan statutes207 are the 
classic example, but there are others as well: the intractable pain acts 
(governing prescribing of controlled substances);208 the living will statutes 
 
 201. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. 
 202. See discussion infra Part IV (statistical evaluation of regulatory processes). 
 203. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 204. See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Rumor’s Reasons, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 22. 
 205. See, e.g., STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME 
TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5–6 (1996), available at www.taxes.state. 
mn.us/taxes/legal_policy/research_reports/content/complnce.pdf.  The study noted that reports of 
income and actual taxes paid increased among taxpayers who received a letter touting a high level 
of compliance with state tax obligations.  Id. at 18–19.  Taxpayers who received a letter 
describing the adverse effect on state budgets when taxpayers failed to pay taxes did not have the 
same effect.  Id.  The study also reported that taxpayers from lower and middle income levels 
reported significantly more income and paid more taxes when they received a letter warning them 
of an upcoming audit, while higher income taxpayers, as a group, showed no increase in reported 
income or taxes paid in response to the letter.  Id.  See also Valerie Braithwaite et al., Taxation 
Threat, Motivational Postures, and Responsive Regulation, 29 L. & POL’Y 137, 138 (2007) 
(discussing factors that contribute to compliance and non-compliance). 
 206. See discussion supra INTRODUCTION. 
 207. See statutes cited infra note 221. 
 208. See statutes cited infra note 223. 
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(providing immunity for compliance with advance directives);209 the 
anatomical gift acts (providing immunity for organ procurement);210 immunity 
for peer-review activities;211 immunity for reporting child abuse;212 and so on.  
The immunity response would seem to be the strongest legal weapon in 
quelling doctors’ fears of legal risk.  Yet, the evidence seems to indicate 
otherwise. 
The Good Samaritan immunity statutes were enacted precisely in response 
to physicians’ expressed fears of liability for their efforts to rescue individuals 
in medical distress in environments that were unequipped for medical care.213  
Studies indicate, however, that these statutes may have little or no effect.214  
There is no demonstrable or observable difference in physician response to 
emergencies in states with Good Samaritan legislation as compared to those 
without such a statute.215  If this research is reliable, why would immunity 
statutes have so little apparent impact when they would appear to be so 
powerful a shield?216 
Immunity statutes are designed to communicate a reassuring message to 
physicians; to alleviate fears that lead them to behave in less socially useful 
ways.  For them to operate as a communicative device, however, physicians 
have to be aware of the existence of the statutes.217  In addition, as a 
communicative device these statutes may have the unexpected effect of 
confirming rather than relieving fears, just as refuting unfounded rumors tends 
to reinforce beliefs in the rumors’ truthfulness.218  In addition, an immunity 
statute may not be able to overcome distrust of the law.  A physician 
participating in a focus group on disciplinary actions, for example, stated: 
 
 209. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 155.50 (2008) (providing immunity both for complying with a 
durable power of attorney for health care and for not complying with it; although the latter 
situation requires the doctor to transfer the patient to another’s care). 
 210. See statutes cited infra note 222. 
 211. See, e.g., Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 
3784 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2000)). 
 212. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 11172 (West 2000). 
 213. Fehlberg, supra note 98, at 497–98 & n.20. 
 214. Eric A. Brandt, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws—The Legal Placebo: A Current 
Analysis, 17 AKRON L. REV. 303, 306 (1983). 
 215. See Frank B. Mapel, III & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws—Who Needs 
Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in the United States, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 
327, 354 (1981). 
 216. Testing impact can be difficult.  For example, intractable pain acts have not appeared 
frequently in case law.  See, e.g., Hoover, supra note 133, at 1385 (holding that statute rebutted 
claim that public policy supported disciplinary action even if act in force at time of doctor’s 
actions).  But see note 230 and accompanying text and note 234. 
 217. There may be gaps in informing doctors about such legislation.  See discussion supra 
note 196. 
 218. See discussion supra Part II. 
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Doctors are asking for reassurance, not more rules or laws.  Even the best 
intentioned of them [laws and rules], create only more fears in the minds of 
doctors trying to do their best, and place more ammunition in the hands of 
lawyers and regulators!  Doctors will avoid the treatment of pain, so as not to 
take the chance of “not being in compliance” with some minor detail . . . .219 
The lack of direct effect on physician behavior after adoption of immunity 
legislation should not be interpreted as proof that doctors’ undesirable behavior 
is not attributable to “bad law,” but rather is motivated by concerns and 
incentives other than law.  It certainly is true that many competing, and at 
times contradictory, forces influence physician behavior, and it is quite 
unlikely that fear of legal entanglement explains everything.220  Viewing 
immunity legislation as a controlled experiment that holds all variables 
constant but for legal risk, however, does not account for limitations in the 
design of such statutes, at least as they apply to health care. 
Immunity statutes in the health care context are rarely absolute.  At a 
minimum, they are always qualified by requirements that the beneficiary of 
this protection have acted in good faith; and under some immunity statutes, the 
health care provider must have acted reasonably or have met the expected 
standard of care.  The Good Samaritan statutes, for example, typically provide 
immunity only to physicians who have acted in “good faith” and who have not 
engaged in gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional misconduct.221  The 
organ procurement immunity statutes also typically set what may be 
considered the lowest or most easily attainable standard for securing immunity; 
i.e., that the party merely have acted in “good faith.”222  The intractable pain 
acts are even more qualified, typically providing that the prescribing physician 
has immunity if the prescribing meets the standards of the profession or some 
other third party standard.223 
These qualifiers make the immunity shield considerably smaller and 
thinner than one might anticipate.  Even if the statute adopts the good faith 
 
 219. Martino, supra note 97, at 333 (alteration in original). 
 220. See discussion supra Part I. 
 221. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 1627.5 (West Supp. 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
537.037.1(1)–(2) (West 2008); ALA. CODE § 6-5-332(e) (LexisNexis 2005); ALASKA STAT. § 
09.65.090(d) (2006). 
 222. See, e.g., ALA. CODE  § 22-19-125 (LexisNexis 2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
856(A) (2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-39-135(a) (Supp. 2008). 
 223. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN § 458.326(3) (West 2007) (referring to the “level of care, 
skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent physician under similar conditions and 
circumstances”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 630.3066 (2007) (protecting physicians that conform to 
regulations adopted by the Board); see also Project on Legal Constraints on Access to Effective 
Pain Relief, The Pain Relief Act, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 317, 318 (1996) (providing immunity 
for doctors “who can demonstrate by reference to an accepted guideline that his or her practice 
substantially complied with that guideline and with the standards of practice” identified in the 
Act); Johnson, supra note 125 (discussing the Act and reviewing other state statutes). 
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standard for immunity, it does not prevent the filing of a lawsuit,224 nor does it 
allow for dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.225  At best, the qualified immunity 
statute requires that discovery proceed and that the claim be considered at the 
summary judgment stage, the earliest point at which the facts that relate to 
good faith or reasonableness can be determined.  A number of cases, in fact, 
require that questions of good faith be submitted to the jury.226  For a 
population that fears the litigation process, this is too little too late to provide 
much reassurance.227 
Identifying this limitation in immunity statutes begs the question of why 
absolute immunity is not usually considered a workable solution in health care.  
In fact, doctors are not the only ones who are afraid.  Policymakers are afraid 
that doctors completely unleashed will behave badly—or at least some of them 
will—and that patients will suffer without legal recourse.228 Agencies 
responsible for policing the medical profession are under constant public 
pressure to do more, catch more, and be tougher.229  Unfortunately, in the face 
of serious risk aversion one cannot both keep doctors on the leash and free 
them.  This is not to argue that absolute immunity for physicians should be the 
norm, but rather that limited immunity is a rather limited response to claims 
that the risk of liability and prosecution is causing doctors to neglect or provide 
inadequate care to patients.  The fact that immunity does not eliminate strategic 
behavior on the part of physicians seeking to avoid legal entanglement should 
not be surprising. 
 
 224. Litigation concerning organ procurement illustrates this point.  See, e.g., Ramirez v. 
Health Partners of S. Ariz., 972 P.2d 658, 669 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (granting summary judgment 
to defendant); Perry v. Saint Francis Hosp., 886 F. Supp. 1551, 1465 (D. Kan. 1995) (denying 
summary judgment to hospital); Schembre v. Mid-Am. Transplant Ass’n, 135 S.W.3d 527, 533 
(Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (denying summary judgment because good faith is a question of fact 
requiring trial); Sattler v. Nw. Tissue Ctr., 42 P.3d 440 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (reversing grant of 
summary judgment to defendant on the question of good faith). 
 225. See, e.g., Hilton v. Children’s Hosp., No. 02-57053, 2004 WL 1700562, at *733 (9th Cir. 
July 29, 2004). 
 226. See Schembre, 135 S.W.3d at 533; Sattler, 42 P.3d at 445. 
 227. See discussion supra Part II.D (penalties of the process). 
 228. See Sage, supra note 67, at 499–500 (discussing the focus on compensation of the 
individual injured patient as an impediment to good policy in regard to medical malpractice 
liability). 
 229. Public Citizen, for example, issues an annual report on the effectiveness of each state 
medical board as measured by the percentage of the state’s doctors who had been disciplined.  
SIDNEY M. WOLFE & KATE RESNEVIC, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP RANKING 
OF THE RATE OF STATE MEDICAL BOARDS’ SERIOUS DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS, 2005–2007, 
(2008), http://www.citizen.org/documents/medicalboardtable.pdf; see BARDACH & KAGAN, 
supra note 34, at 72–74 (discussing the impact of quantitative expectations for number of 
citations by inspectors). 
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In addition to the obvious intention to influence doctors, immunity statutes 
may be intended to communicate to enforcement agencies and potential 
plaintiffs.  One would expect, for example, that prosecutors and plaintiffs 
might account for immunity statutes in deciding whether to prosecute or file 
suit at all.  Immunity legislation may also be intended to communicate to 
regulatory agencies.  For example, in the case of the intractable pain acts, the 
prospects of legislative action giving doctors immunity from discipline in 
particular situations pushed the medical boards toward changing their own 
policies to demonstrate to the legislatures that the statutes were not needed.  In 
fact, the FSMB advised state medical boards to “be proactive in the promotion 
of pain management policy initiatives to preclude legislative intervention.”230  
From the perspective of advocates for those immunity statutes, the effect on 
medical boards itself furthered the achievement of the goals of the legislative 
effort. 
C. Safe Harbors 
Government agencies regularly identify detailed templates for financial 
and management arrangements that are deemed to meet the legal requirements 
those agencies enforce.  These “safe harbors” channel transactions toward the 
designs that the agency has determined are acceptable under the law.  These 
rules are not mandates or prohibitions: safe harbors don’t prohibit providers 
from structuring their agreements otherwise, but they provide an official seal 
of approval for particular arrangements.  They are a voluntary restraint on the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and make a promise of sanctuary for those 
favored transactions.  Those doctors who are more entrepreneurial, or more 
well-armed with legal and financial counsel, or who have more to gain will test 
the waters outside of the transactional safe harbors. 
There are some safe harbors in clinical areas as well.  Some states have 
enacted legislation to create a safe harbor for physicians’ denying their patients 
“futile” care.231  Some states have enacted legislation to protect physicians who 
comply with particular guidelines from malpractice liability.232  In the area of 
prescribing, many state medical boards for some time have informed doctors 
 
 230. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., POSITION OF THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL 
BOARDS: IN SUPPORT OF ADOPTION OF PAIN MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES 2 (1998), 
http://www.fsmb.org/pdf/1998_grpol_Pain_Management_Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter FSMB, 
POSITION IN SUPPORT OF GUIDELINES] (emphasis added). 
 231. See, e.g., Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to 
Unilaterally Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1 (2007) (criticizing safe harbor 
statutes for medical futility decisions as ineffective, with the exception of the Texas statute).  The 
presumptions attached by statute to signed consent forms could also be viewed as a safe harbor as 
they typically do not provide that treatment without a signed form is a battery.  They simply 
identify a “safest” channel for the practicing doctor.  See supra note 41. 
 232. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 1516–24. 
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that they would not take any action against them for prescribing controlled 
substances if their patients had cancer or were terminally ill.233  Further, the 
FSMB issued formal guidelines, adopted by many state medical boards, to 
assure physicians that their treatment of patients for chronic pain would not 
violate the boards’ standards.234 
Two physicians considering the potential impact of legal guidelines meant 
to provide a safe harbor from regulatory scrutiny speculate from their own 
experience that these efforts may have a perverse effect.  They observe: 
Our experience suggests that many physicians will briefly scan guidelines and 
may come away with the wrong impression . . . . It is entirely possible that the 
promulgation of guidelines will make physicians perceive that prescribing 
opioids for chronic pain is under even greater scrutiny than they thought, 
causing them to be even less willing to prescribe opioids for any reason.235 
Whether doctors behave differently in terms of pushing the boundaries of 
the templates set in transactional safe harbors, as compared to clinical safe 
harbors, is a matter of speculation.236 There is some sense that doctors are 
willing to push the envelope on the financial side and in their business 
relationships and are less willing to do that, and assume avoidable legal risk, in 
their clinical decisions.237  The importance of reputation and the shame 
 
 233. David E. Joranson et al., Opioids for Chronic Cancer and Non-Cancer Pain: A Survery 
of State Medical Board Members, 79 J. MED. LICENSURE & DISCIPLINE 15 (1992) (reporting on 
attitudes of board members).  See also Hurwitz v. Bd. of Med., 46 Va. Cir. 119, 1998 WL 972259 
(Va. Cir. Ct. Jun. 30, 1998), referring to state’s intractable pain act as a “safe harbor.” 
 234. FSMB, MODEL POLICY, supra note 135.  This policy revises the Model Guidelines for 
the Use of Controlled Substances for the Treatment of Pain.  The Policy requires physicians to 
take a medical history and perform a physical exam of the patient with some frequency; to 
document in the medical record the nature and intensity of the pain and current and past treatment 
for pain, related conditions, the effect of pain on function, any history of substance abuse, and at 
least one “recognized medical indication” for prescription of a controlled substance; establish a 
written treatment plan; secure informed consent; and seek appropriate consultation, among other 
items.  Id.  These guidelines have been adopted in some form by twenty-two state medical boards.  
Id.  A study of medical board practices concludes that the boards actually relied on such policies 
in their disciplinary actions.  Hoffmann & Tarzian, supra note 137, at 23. 
 235. J. David Haddox & Gerald M. Aronoff, Commentary, The Potential for Unintended 
Consequences from Public Policy Shifts in the Treatment of Pain, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 350, 
351 (1998). 
 236. It is not clear that transactional safe harbors and clinical safe harbors are functionally the 
same either.  It might be reasonable to hypothesize that transactional safe harbors can be more 
definitive and less ambiguous than clinical safe harbors, for example, so that clinical safe harbors 
always bear the burden of uncertainty.  This uncertainty in legal standards may produce more 
cautious responses. The discussion that follows assumes that the safe harbors function in 
essentially the same manner but that doctors react differently. 
 237. See supra note 31 (discussing the limitations of generalizations about the behavior of 
doctors).  In particular, some have hypothesized significant differences among doctors in relation 
to commercial interests and incentives.  See, e.g., Dolgin, supra note 31, at 733–34. 
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associated with failures of medical judgment are well-documented.238 
Shortcomings in the care of patients go to the very identity of the physician.239  
It is possible that the same shame and identity issues are not triggered when 
doctors get in trouble for business relationships,240 and so they are quite willing 
to push the envelope and bear a risk of legal sanction in the commercial sphere 
of their activities.241 
A distinction between testing the boundaries of business as compared to 
clinical safe harbors also may reflect a rational calculation of risk and benefit.  
The upside risk of going beyond the boundaries of business safe harbors is 
increased profit and income, a significant temptation of payoff.  The upside 
risk of pushing the envelope of clinical safe harbors for most doctors is treating 
one patient instead of a fungible other who also needs medical care but may be 
considered undesirable because of the risk involved.  In his concurring opinion 
in Conant v. Walters,242 for example, Judge Kozinski notes that: 
[T]he doctor’s interest in giving advice about the medical use of marijuana is 
somewhat remote and impersonal; they will derive no direct benefit from 
giving this advice, other than the satisfaction of doing their jobs well.  At the 
same time, the burden of the federal policy [of investigating physicians who 
recommend marijuana to their patients] . . . falls directly and personally on the 
doctors . . . . [T]hey may destroy their careers and lose their livelihoods. 
  This disparity between benefits and burdens matters because it makes 
doctors peculiarly vulnerable to intimidation . . . .243 
 
 238. See COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN 
(Linda T. Kohn & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 1999); Robert A. Burt, Doctors vs. Lawyers: The 
Perils of Perfectionism, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1177 (2009). 
 239. Bosk observed that some errors were forgivable and others were not in the context of 
residency training.  BOSK, supra note 26, at 168–69.  Those that could be categorized as moral 
failings were unforgivable, but those that were errors in technique or skill were not.  Id.; see also 
KAPP, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that doctors interpret a malpractice suit as “deeply personal and 
intimate, yet simultaneously an embarrassingly public affront against their very integrity and 
worth as professionals and as people”). 
 240. Of course some business relationships, such as self-referrals and other forms of conflicts 
of interest, bridge the business and clinical personas.  As discussed earlier, however, this 
crossover may not be appreciated.  See generally Jesse Goldner, Regulating Conflicts of Interest 
in Research: The Paper Tiger Needs Real Teeth, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1211 (2009) (discussing the 
physician researchers’ conflicts of interest when conducting human subject research). 
 241. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 41, at 189 (“[The] Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission . . . have confronted bands of businessmen who have steadfastly refused to 
pay attention to legal precedent, repeated governmental pronouncements, and administrative 
sanctions imposed on their colleagues[,] . . . [demonstrating] a willingness to blatantly disregard 
the law by repeatedly undertaking arrangements already deemed illegal by the enforcers . . . .” 
(referring to physicians)). 
 242. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 639–48 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 243. Id. at 639–40. 
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The development of safe harbors for clinical practice presents an additional 
challenge for the quality of medical care.  Safe harbors typically are developed 
through a stakeholder process involving regulators, prosecutors, 
consumers/patients, and those subject to the safe harbor.244  Prosecutors and 
regulators have strong motivation to retain a margin of discretion for 
themselves to be used in deciding whether or not to prosecute individual cases.  
In addition, those charged with enforcing legal standards are quite concerned 
with how the safe harbors and guidelines will influence ongoing prosecutions 
that they view as falling outside of the safe harbor.245  With the retention of 
discretion and success in prosecution as primary and immediate professional 
and policy goals, prosecutors would be expected to argue that the safe harbor 
should establish boundaries that would be well within the range of what would 
ultimately be considered acceptable and legitimate medical practice.  Thus, the 
clinical safe harbor creates a legally “safest” channel within the range of 
acceptable medical practice. 
To illustrate: assume a range of interventions from 1 to 100, and that the 
range of appropriate treatment lies between 10 and 90.  To retain a margin for 
prosecutorial or regulatory discretion in individual cases, the clinical safe 
harbor is set to cover behavior in the range of 30 to 70.  This means that while 
doctors practicing in the range between 10 and 30 and between 70 and 90 are 
engaged in legitimate medical practice, they simply are not guaranteed 
protection from government scrutiny. 
The risk-averse doctor who fears investigation and potential prosecution by 
enforcement agencies and the rational doctor who calculates the risks and 
benefits of choosing to treat one type of patient over another both stay well 
within the identified safe harbors.  At the same time, risk-averse prosecutors 
are setting the boundaries of the safe harbor more narrowly than the bounds of 
legal, appropriate, desirable and perhaps necessary medical practice.  The 
problem with this double risk aversion is that prosecutors’ preservation of 
discretion and doctors’ avoidance of legal risk results in a channeling effect 
that leaves some patients stranded in the margins.  For example, the state 
medical board safe harbors for those physicians treating patients who have 
cancer or who are terminally ill246 certainly may have reassured doctors and 
encouraged them to treat those patients with adequate analgesics; but they may 
have likewise driven doctors toward that safest channel and away from chronic 
 
 244. The FSMB, for example, gathered state medical board members and investigators, DEA 
investigators and administrators, practicing physicians, medical researchers, and patient 
advocates, among others, in developing its model guidelines on the use of controlled substances 
in pain management.  FSMB, POSITION IN SUPPORT OF GUIDELINES, supra note 230, at 1. 
 245. See Hoffmann, supra note 151, at 245–50, 282 (discussing the Hurwitz case and the 
DEA’s withdrawal of the FAQs). 
 246. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
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pain patients, decreasing the availability of necessary treatment for those 
patients.  Furthermore, the FSMB’s safe harbor sets special requirements for 
the treatment of patients who have a “history of substance abuse” or who are at 
a “high risk of medication abuse” or who are “at risk of medication misuse, 
abuse, or diversion” without further specification.247  At a threshold level, 
these descriptors may lead physicians to exclude patients whose general 
characteristics, including race, medical condition, or source of pay, are 
mistakenly viewed as surrogates for a risk of abuse or diversion of controlled 
substances.248  Any patient whose characteristics, medical needs, or other 
circumstances place them outside of the safest channel may find it more 
difficult to secure appropriate and necessary care even though they fall within 
the scope of legitimate medical practice. 
While the safe harbor process may intend only to “green light” particular 
practices, doctors receiving that signal in the clinical setting may think of the 
safe harbors in terms of the familiar green-yellow-red progression.  What is not 
green must be red or yellow; and it can be dangerous to proceed through a 
yellow light, especially with massive on-coming traffic.  Safe harbors and 
guidelines are comfortable tools for regulators, but at least as to the clinical 
safe harbors, some have asserted “bad law” claims; i.e., that they dissuade 
good doctors from providing good care.  Empirical research that would reveal 
whether clinical safe harbors are having the negative channeling effect that 
results in limiting appropriate and necessary care is missing.  The self-reports 
that do exist may be misleading, but if clinical safe harbors induce the 
undesired behavior as some have argued, it would be important to know that. 
D. Eliminating Asymmetry 
At times, legal risk is lined up entirely on one side as the doctor looks at 
the risks of particular decisions.  For example, in the situation addressed in 
Conant v. Walters, only the doctor who discussed the potential of marijuana 
for control of particular symptoms or conditions faced the risk of DEA 
investigation and prosecution.249  The doctor who remained silent faced no 
legal risk at all: the patient could not sue her for failing to disclose a legitimate 
treatment and neither the state medical board nor the DEA would make an 
inquiry about the adequacy of care.  Similarly, when we began our work on 
pain management in 1995, only the doctor who prescribed opioids for his 
 
 247. See FSMB, MODEL POLICY, supra note 135; see also NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, UNDER THE COUNTER: DIVERSION AND ABUSE OF CONTROLLED 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS IN THE U.S. 31 (2005). 
 248. See Johnson, supra note 95, at 747 (discussing “red-flags,” or indicators, often used 
mistakenly to identify patients as suspicious). 
 249. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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patients in pain faced investigation, sanctions, and liability claims.250  The 
doctor who used the less effective medications and neglected their patient’s 
pain faced no legal risk at all. 
The natural response to legal risk asymmetry is to even things up.  In the 
pain management field, advocates of improved treatment encouraged medical 
boards to discipline physicians for negligent care of patients in pain as a signal 
to the profession that failing to prescribe adequate medications 
(“underprescibing”) was as risky as “overprescribing.”251  They also increased 
the liability risk by bringing high-profile lawsuits in egregious cases of 
neglect.252  Eliminating asymmetry was a primary strategy of some advocates 
in the case of physical restraints as well.  They encouraged and participated in 
personal injury lawsuits on behalf of persons injured by restraints253 and 
advocated a change in regulations that would set standards and penalties for 
the use of restraints.  Similarly, individuals concerned that doctors rejected 
patients’ or surrogates’ decisions to withdraw consent for continued life-
sustaining medical treatment, for fear of criminal prosecution, advocated 
recognition of a cause of action for non-compliance with the patient’s or 
surrogate’s decision.254 
Not surprisingly, these efforts to eliminate asymmetry are not warmly 
received in medicine.  Instead of viewing these developments as efforts to 
balance legal risks rationally, with an eye toward producing better outcomes, 
doctors are nihilistic about the operation of law.  You’re damned if you do, and 
damned if you don’t. 255  What matters is whether eliminating asymmetry has 
the desired outcome of improving patient care. 
 
 250. See Johnson, supra note 125, at 320; Ben A. Rich, A Prescription for the Pain: The 
Emerging Standard of Care for Pain Management, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 49–50 (2000); 
Robyn S. Shapiro, Health Care Providers’ Liability Exposure for Inappropriate Pain 
Management, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 360, 363 (1996). 
 251. See Rich supra note 250, at 16 & nn.97–99, 69 & n.374. 
 252. See id. at 84, 90 (discussing Bergman v. Chin, No. H205732-1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. 
Ct. Feb. 16, 1999); Estate of Henry James v. Hillhaven Corp., No. 89 CVS 64 (N.C. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 15, 1991)); Shapiro, supra note 250, at 361 (discussing Estate of Henry James, No. 89 CVS 
64)). 
 253. Julie A. Braun & Elizabeth A. Capezuti, The Legal and Medical Aspects of Physical 
Restraints and Bed Siderails and Their Relationship to Falls and Fall-Related Injuries in Nursing 
Homes, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 22–25 (2000) (describing litigation involving injuries 
due to restraints). 
 254. See generally Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful 
Living Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J. 625 (1986) (describing such cases). 
 255. Matthew Yi, Doctor Found Reckless for Not Relieving Pain, S.F. CHRON., June 14, 
2001, at A1. 
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IV.  REFRAMING EVALUATION AND SURVEILLANCE 
This paper has argued that doctors’ “bad law” claims can carry important 
information that is critical to the achievement of the goals of regulation.  Some 
of these claims reveal concrete problems in the implementation of regulatory 
standards, including the “shadow systems” that lurk below the formal surface 
of the regulatory system.256  Taking doctors’ “bad law” claims seriously 
requires that we expand our notions of and methods for measuring the 
effectiveness of law.  It also requires that enforcement policies take account of 
predictable risk-avoidance behavior. 
A. Defining and Measuring Effectiveness 
Empirical research on physician response to legal risk is thin, and 
motivations are likely to be complex.  It seems entirely believable, however, 
that fears over the prospect of legal entanglement and potential sanctions may 
influence doctors to alter their practices in undesirable ways.  Just as medical 
treatment produces iatrogenic harm, legal regimes intended to protect patients 
from bad doctors or doctors behaving badly can have negative spillover 
effects.  Arguing that something is likely is not the same as having convincing 
proof that it is so, however.  Empirical research focused specifically on the 
question of physician behavior in response to legal risk can contribute to the 
effort to align regulatory effects with regulatory goals. 
Framing empirical research on the impact of law in terms of the individual 
case—did this case appropriately apply the standard to this particular doctor—
is too narrow.  Individualized case-based analysis can make a contribution to 
our understanding of the content and application of the law by the courts or 
agencies in their adjudicative function,257 but it does not give us a window into 
the impact of that law on physician practices and, thus, the law’s impact on 
access to and quality of care.  Statistical analysis of the incidence of 
enforcement activities—what proportion of doctors are disciplined by the 
state’s medical board in comparison to other states,258 for example, or what 
amount of federal monies are recovered in fraud prosecutions259—certainly 
broadens the frame away from the individual case.  When statistical analysis 
 
 256. See discussion supra Part II. 
 257. Even as to this question, the study of cases is limited.  See Sage, supra note 82, at 50. 
 258. See, e.g., WOLFE & RESNEVIC, supra note 229 (providing an annual report on the 
number and percentage of doctors disciplined, and evaluation of states based on those numbers). 
 259. See DEP’T OF  HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2007, at 6–8 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hcfacreport2007.pdf. 
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operates without a notion of what the “right” number is, however, it is not 
helpful260 and can be harmful.261 
Neither of these two concepts—defining effectiveness in terms of 
application to the individual case or in terms of statistical data about the 
incidence of enforcement actions—is adequate.  Whether taken separately or 
together, these concepts of effectiveness do not take account of how the 
regulations and enforcement efforts influence the behavior of physicians who 
are not caught in the proceedings that produce the individual case or the 
statistical analysis of enforcement actions.  They cannot measure changes in 
physician risk-avoidance behavior that may be producing lower quality or less 
accessible care.  We want to deter bad doctors and bad behavior, but we also 
have to assess what impact the regulatory system is having on the good doctor 
and good behavior left undone.  The evaluation of the law as applied should be 
reframed to examine the population-based effects on the behavior of 
physicians, adopting a public health model for the effect of law, despite the 
considerable challenges in doing so.262 
B. Accounting for Behavior Patterns 
Some features of physician behavior in reaction to legal risk should be 
accepted as they are.  This call to take doctors’ “bad law” claims seriously and 
to accept certain behavior patterns does not argue that regulatory standards and 
goals should be abandoned.  Rather, an understanding of the reactive, risk-
 
 260. The GAO, for example, issued two reports concerning the effectiveness of federal-state 
efforts to enforce quality standards for nursing homes.  Acknowledging that the number of 
nursing homes cited for deficiencies decreased between 1999 and 2005, the GAO reports that the 
reduction in cited deficiencies does not correlate, in their view, with improvements in the quality 
of care but rather with less effective inspection and enforcement systems.  U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NURSING HOMES: CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED TO IMPROVE THE 
QUALITY OF CARE IN SMALL BUT SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF HOMES (2007); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT HAVE NOT 
DETERRED SOME HOMES FROM REPEATEDLY HARMING RESIDENTS (2007).  In contrast, the 
Department of Health and Human Services reported that the quality of nursing homes actually has 
improved.  Nursing Home Quality Improves, HHS Says in Announcing Expanded Initiative, 14 
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 34 (Jan. 6, 2005). 
 261. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 73–74 (discussing the impact of counting 
citations on surveillance behavior). 
 262. This argument may also be situated in a public health approach to the impact of law just 
as medicine is being challenged to reframe itself toward a public health methodology that looks at 
population-based outcomes rather than only the individual patient.  See, e.g., Barbara A. Noah, 
Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 449, 450–51 (2000) (“Providers have strongly protested the allocation of health services 
on a population-wide basis under managed care . . . . [B]ut the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of information relating to adverse drug reactions demands an emphasis on 
population-based outcomes and utility.” (footnote omitted)). 
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avoidance behavior of doctors should be used strategically to enhance the 
effectiveness of the regulatory effort.263  In particular, this understanding and 
accommodation should assure that policy goals are not hijacked by the 
enforcement process.  This paper has argued at several points that mid-level 
decisions and policies concerning enforcement practices—what is monitored 
or required to be reported; who is investigated; what rituals and processes 
accompany the investigation—can have a profound effect on physician 
behavior in avoiding particular patients or practices.  In particular, monitoring 
and investigation processes are likely to have a substantial influence on 
physician behavior that can lead to undesired consequences. 
1. Monitoring 
Simply watching someone, or persuading someone that they are being 
watched, makes the person change their behavior.  Visible surveillance is a 
powerful tool of social control.264  Regulatory monitoring, thus, should be 
viewed as a tool to determine behavior rather than simply a source of 
information. 
 
 263. Cf. FURROW ET AL., supra note 36, at 163–67 (comparing nursing homes to hospitals 
and arguing that differences between the two explain observed differences in the nature of 
regulatory design for each). See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE 
REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 4 (1992) (arguing that regulatory 
design should take account of industry structure, motivations of regulated agents, and industry 
conduct).  Contrary to the argument in this paper that established behavior patterns should be 
used where possible to make regulation more effective, Jolls and Sunstein argue that the law can 
be used to “debias” familiar heuristics.  Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through 
Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 207–19 (2006).  Critiques of the application of cognitive theory to 
regulation might argue that the approach recommended here manipulates human behavior.  See, 
e.g., Wilson, supra note 103, at 224 (responding to claims that designing regulatory systems to 
respond to heuristics identified by cognitive research is exploitative). 
 264. This phenomenon is commonly referred to as the “Hawthorne Effect,” stemming from 
behavioral research at the Hawthorne Works factory outside of Chicago in the early 1900s in 
which researchers observed improvements in worker productivity that could be attributed only to 
the fact that the workers knew that they were being evaluated.  See Stephen R.G. Jones, Was 
There a Hawthorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 451 (1992).  The concept has been tested in a 
variety of settings.  See, e.g., Carol L. Freund et al., Natural Settings Trials—Improving the 
Introduction of Clinical Genetic Tests, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 106, 108 (2004) (discussing the 
ethical challenges of accounting for the Hawthorne Effect in clinical trials); Herbert Sherman, 
Surveillance Effects on Community Physician Test Ordering, 22 MED. CARE 80 (1984) 
(documenting effects of surveillance on physician behavior in ordering a diagnostic test); see also 
infra notes 266–72 and accompanying text (discussing prescription monitoring).  Some criticism 
of the Hawthorne Effect as a viable methodological theory has emerged.  See, e.g., Jones, supra, 
at 452; Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1269–70 (2004) (book 
review). 
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Doctors may be hypersensitive and culturally resistant to any external 
oversight of their actions.265  If this position on their part is morally or 
politically offensive, the regulatory battle can be engaged as a matter of 
principle: we have a duty to make you accountable, and so shall you be.  If 
instead, better patient care or a better health care system remains the priority, a 
more pragmatic approach should be adopted.  If the reactive behavior change is 
desired, monitoring becomes an effective tool; if instead, the monitoring-
stimulated behavior change is undesirable, visible monitoring becomes an 
impediment to achievement of the primary goal. 
Prescription monitoring offers a useful example.266  Every state engages in 
some system of monitoring to collect individualized data on doctors’ 
prescribing of controlled substances.  Until the late 1990s, many of these 
efforts were paper-based systems in which doctors produced three paper copies 
of the prescription (one for the pharmacy, one for the doctor’s files, and one 
for the state).267  Doctors could not avoid being aware of government oversight 
of each prescription they wrote.  Both survey data about self-reported changes 
in prescribing268 and quantitative data about volume and frequency in 
prescribing of particular medications269 showed that these paper monitoring 
systems actually reduced the prescription of controlled substances.  If the goal 
of the monitoring system was to reduce the availability of controlled 
substances, this effect was a success.  It is a passive and inexpensive 
 
 265. See Deborah A. Savage, Professional Sovereignty Revisited: The Network 
Transformation of American Medicine?, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 661, 671, 674 (2004) 
(discussing network theory as a support for the primacy of peer monitoring in medicine and the 
rejection of managerial or other outsider monitoring); see also Bruce E. Landon et al., Changes in 
Career Satisfaction Among Primary Care and Specialist Physicians, 1997–2001, 289 JAMA 442, 
447 (2003) (relating satisfaction primarily to autonomy and the ability to provide high quality 
care); Jin Lei, Clinical Autonomy and the Rationalization of Clinical Practice (Aug. 14, 2004) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_ 
citation/1/1/0/3/8/p110387_index.html. 
 266. Mandatory reporting systems are monitoring systems, and so can operate in the same 
fashion.  See supra notes 147–150 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory reporting in the 
context of physical restraints). 
 267. This particular paper-based monitoring system was called the triplicate prescription 
system.  Another paper-based system required that physicians use state-issued sequentially 
numbered prescription slips for prescriptions of certain medications categorized as controlled 
substances. 
 268. David B. Brushwood, Maximizing the Value of Electronic Prescription Monitoring 
Programs, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 41, 46–47 (reporting on data that shows that prescribing of 
pain medications increased in states that moved from paper-based prescription monitoring 
systems to electronic systems). 
 269. See, e.g., ABA COMM’N ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF THE ELDERLY, REPORT TO THE 
HOUSE OF DELEGATES: PROPOSED ABA POLICY ON LEGAL OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE PAIN 
MANAGEMENT (2000), available at http://www.abanet.org/aging/resources/docs/policyfinal.doc 
(citing studies that show that paper-based monitoring “may deter legitimate prescribing”). 
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enforcement system because no one even has to actually review the material 
produced in order for the system to have its targeted effect.  Reducing the 
prescribing of controlled substances for the treatment of pain, however, is not 
consistent with the goal of improving patient care.270 
The switch to an electronic monitoring system,271 which does not involve 
any action by the physician, appears not to have the same effect on the volume 
and frequency of prescribing.272  If the goal of the system is appropriate 
prescribing, rather than a simple reduction in volume, an invisible system 
better achieves that goal without hampering oversight. 
A visible monitoring system has an independent impact on physician 
behavior and produces an outcome that may either reinforce or undermine the 
goals of regulating physician prescribing.  Whether the monitoring system 
should be visible or invisible can be resolved on an entirely pragmatic level.  A 
pragmatic approach would accept physician sensitivity to external oversight as 
a given.  Rather than exhorting doctors to practice good medicine without fear, 
advocates for better care can accommodate the monitoring system to physician 
behavior and better accomplish their goals.273 
The choice between visible and invisible monitoring systems, however, 
requires clarity in the substantive goals of the particular regulation.  If the 
desire is to reduce the prescription of narcotics, for example, a very visible 
monitoring system that reminds physicians daily that they are being watched 
should be chosen.  If the concern is that reduction in the prescription of 
narcotics results in poor care because doctors are not prescribing necessary 
medication, however, one would choose an invisible monitoring system, all 
other things being equal.274  Of course, electronic prescription monitoring 
 
 270. David E. Joranson & Aaron M. Gilson, Regulatory Barriers to Pain Management, 14 
ONCOLOGY NURSING 158 (1998) (reporting on the large body of research documenting adverse 
effects on prescribing: “although administrators of [paper-based] prescription monitoring 
programs assert that quality of care is not compromised, empirical evidence suggests otherwise”). 
 271. See, e.g., Nathaniel Katz et al., Update on Prescription Monitoring in Clinical Practice: 
A Survey Study of Prescription Monitoring Program Administrators, 9 PAIN MED. 587 (2008) 
(reporting on the operation of electronic monitoring programs). 
 272. See Brushwood, supra note 268, at 44–45.  Brushwood notes, however, that the evidence 
of increase in prescribing may not be directly related to the change in monitoring, as there may 
have been other influences as well.  Id. at 47.  It may be that as doctors come to “see” the 
monitoring, its invisibility will dissipate and the monitoring effect on behavior will set in; but this 
does not undermine the point made here. 
 273. For discussion in another context, see Fazal Khan, The Human Factor: Globalizing 
Ethical Standards in Drug Trials Through Market Exclusion, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 877, 911 
(2008), suggesting that visible observation might be used to increase compliance with regulatory 
standards for drug trials.  See also Johnson, supra note 93 (describing impact of monitoring of 
hospital length-of-stay on physician behavior). 
 274. This article addresses only the issue of monitoring physician prescribing and not the 
monitoring of patient behavior in regard to prescriptions.  In addition, the electronic system will 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] TAKING DOCTORS’ “BAD LAW” CLAIMS SERIOUSLY 1029 
raises its own complicated issues relating to the appropriateness and accuracy 
of the data collected and the use to which it is put.275  Prescription monitoring, 
however, illustrates both the strategic accommodation to physician behavior to 
achieve regulatory effectiveness, and the policy issues that must be decided in 
evaluating the operation of the monitoring system. 
2. Investigation 
Doctors also fear being subjected to government inquiry or investigation.  
The costs of the inquiry or investigation include financial costs, disruption of 
the practice, damage to reputation, resultant ostracism or termination of 
necessary business relationships, stress, shame, and other losses that are quite 
significant.276  At the same time, regulators enforcing standards want to assure 
that they uncover the few bad apples and so may cast a broad investigative net.  
This broad net would be expected to catch the small number of violators, but it 
would also be expected to catch a number of doctors who will not be charged 
with violations.  The regulator who justifies casting the investigative net 
broadly as triggering “only” an inquiry or further investigation but not 
necessarily sanctions fails to appreciate the substantial penalties that are 
inherent in the investigation itself.  The intent of the law—protection of 
patients—is subverted by a “catch-and-release” surveillance system. 
A rational reaction to the personal costs of inquiry or investigation, which 
are well-understood by doctors, is to alter their practice and treatment 
 
produce data that is much more easily used in the enforcement process, so concerns over the 
quality and use of the data remain.  As a monitoring device standing alone, the invisible program 
has the advantage of avoiding perverse effects on physician prescribing.  See Brushwood, supra 
note 268, at 41 (arguing that such systems should be evaluated on whether they are safe (in terms 
of avoidance of adverse consequences such as invasions of patient privacy and interference with 
legitimate prescribing in the way that the data is used) and effective (in terms of reducing abuse 
of controlled substances)).  See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (considering the 
constitutionality of New York’s triplicate prescription monitoring system). 
 275. This discussion leaves open the question of whether the data collected is appropriate and 
accurate and whether it is used in an appropriate manner.  To some extent, of course, the capacity 
of the electronic system itself becomes a driving source for ever-expanding use of the data.  
Electronic prescription monitoring systems are subject to failures in the quality and accuracy of 
the data collected as well as abuses in the use of the data against physicians and patients.  See, 
e.g., Katz et al., supra note 271, at 592–93 (describing some of these concerns as to how the 
electronic systems are operating in this regard).  The electronic system’s responsiveness to 
concerns over the negative influence of paper systems on physician prescribing may be offset by 
the effects on prescribing that the particular uses of the data may produce.  Physicians may have 
the capacity to monitor each patient’s complete prescription profile, an outcome that seems 
consistent with health concerns, but may then use exclusionary criteria for treatment that do not 
relate to medical concerns or evidence-based standards of care.  See Brushwood, supra note 268, 
at 44–45. 
 276. See discussion supra Part II.D. 
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decisions to avoid being caught in the net at all.277  “Net avoidance” can mean 
that doctors will avoid particular patients or particular treatments that in fact 
are legitimate and are quite unlikely to result in formal sanctions.278  This 
reaction to the prospects of investigation thus can cause harm, in terms of 
reduced access or lower quality of care, and can undermine the ultimate goal of 
improving patients’ health and well-being. 
For example, state medical boards and the DEA routinely mine data from 
the prescription monitoring systems279 to identify those doctors who write the 
higher volumes of prescriptions for controlled substances in their geographic 
area.  Doctors on the high side of prescribing are then subjected to further 
inquiry and investigation.  Net avoidance would explain, then, why doctors 
want to stay in the middle of the pack in their prescribing.  Unfortunately, 
however, the middle of the pack may be practicing bad medicine by failing to 
provide adequate treatment for their patients—denying them effective 
medication.280  At a minimum, regulators should set the parameters for 
investigation and inquiry as narrowly as possible to achieve the goals that they 
desire, and in a fashion that does not contradict the formal legal standard.  
They should recognize that they have to balance the risk that some violators 
will not be caught if the investigative parameters are too narrow with the risk 
that the majority of doctors will gear their practice to avoid being investigated.  
In addition, they should not use indicators, such as the prescription volume, 
that standing alone have little to do with whether the physician is practicing 
good or bad medicine. 
Of course, instead of adjusting their use of inquiries and investigations, 
regulators could maintain an aggressive investigation stance and try to educate 
doctors about the importance of the agency’s efforts and to reassure them that 
“good doctors” are safe.  These efforts are quite likely to be ineffective.281  
This is the course that the DEA has adopted, for example.282  The agency could 
make sure that doctors understand that their being investigated is not a finding 
 
 277. See discussion supra Part III. 
 278. See discussion supra Part III.C. 
 279. See Brushwood, supra note 268, at 45–47 (discussing the use of data by the DEA and 
several states to determine the success of paper-based prescription monitoring systems); supra 
Part IV.B.1. 
 280. See discussion of early adopters, supra notes 124–25 and accompanying text; supra note 
119 and accompanying text concerning overcompliance; and supra notes 147–50 and 
accompanying text concerning use of restraints. 
 281. See discussion supra Part III.ASimilarly, as used as an indicator, the percentage of 
nursing home residents who were physically restrained did not reflect quality of care, nor did it 
negate the influence of claimed “bad laws” on perpetuating the practice.  See supra notes 147–
150 and accompanying text. 
 281. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 282. See News Release, supra note 198. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] TAKING DOCTORS’ “BAD LAW” CLAIMS SERIOUSLY 1031 
of guilt, even though there is some evidence that health care organizations of 
their peers may take action based on the investigation alone283 and that the 
agency may thereafter view the doctor as suspicious.284  No amount of 
reassurance is likely to persuade a doctor that an inquiry or investigation by the 
state medical board or the DEA is not threatening and damaging.  Regulation 
that is goal-oriented will account for these reactions in selecting the parameters 
for triggering an investigation or inquiry. 
CONCLUSION 
Even firm supporters of regulatory efforts, including this author, must 
accept that well-intentioned regulatory standards and enforcement systems can 
have negative outcomes as physicians react, and patients suffer as a result.  
Taking physicians’ “bad law” complaints seriously brings physician behavior 
to the table as a credible and legitimate factor in evaluating the performance of 
the law.  Physicians’ “bad law” claims, if treated like sentinel events that 
require further investigation, can provide critical and otherwise unattainable 
information about the operation of legal standards.  In addition, physician 
response to a specific regulation or enforcement system, including risk-
avoidance behavior that reduces the availability of appropriate care, may alter 
the risk-benefit calculus for particular standards.  Taking “bad law” claims 
seriously appreciates that the behavior-inducing effects of the enforcement 
effort may thwart the goals of the regulation itself. 
Our common responses to physicians’ “bad law” complaints are not as 
effective as they may appear.  We need new tools, and one of those tools may 
be a better understanding of how doctors alter their behavior in relation to legal 
risk.  This paper has demonstrated, for example, that better understanding of 
physician reaction to monitoring and investigations should influence how 
surveillance is conducted. 
Even assuming perfect information and perfect alignment of tools and 
goals, however, persons concerned with the impact of law on physician 
behavior face at least two persistent challenges.  First, empirical research on 
the influences on physician behavior consistently reveals multiple motivations, 
and it is unlikely that addressing legal concerns alone will make significant 
change.  Still, a hammer is what law reformers have, and so some 
responsibility for its strokes lies there.  Second, some of the negative effects of 
regulating physician behavior are irreducible.  Law is not a precision 
instrument, and some degree of negative consequences, at the margins at least, 
 
 283. See Goldner, supra note 74, at 342–43 (detailing organizational responses to physicians 
cleared in investigations for scientific misconduct). 
 284. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 34, at 73. 
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seems unavoidable.  Reducing negative consequences is worthwhile however, 
even if zero tolerance is impractical. 
A better understanding of physician behavior in the face of legal risk 
would allow us to improve the effectiveness of law in achieving desired goals.  
This better understanding begins with taking physicians’ “bad law” claims 
seriously, neither dismissing them too easily nor taking them at face value.  
Still, the health law reform effort remains a normative and political exercise; 
and social, political, and ethical norms influence the standards we choose to set 
for medicine.  In some circumstances, consequences will be viewed as 
unimportant, but better that they are known than unknown when that choice is 
made. 
 
